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STATUTES REPRODUCED
§ 61-2-11
Investigations - Subpoena power of division Revocation or suspension of license - Grounds
The division may investigate or cause to
be investigated the actions of any principal
broker, associate broker, sales agent, real
estate school, course provider, or school
instructor licensed or certified by this
state, or of any applicant for licensure or
certification, or of any person who acts in
any of those capacities within this state.
The division is empowered to subpoena
witnesses, take evidence, and require by
subpoena duces tecum the production of books,
papers, contracts, records, o^her documentls,
or information considered relevant to the
investigation. Each failure to respond to s
subpoena is considered as a separate
violation of this chapter. The commission,
with the concurrence of the director, may
impose a civil penalty in an amount not td
exceed $500 per violation or suspend, revdke,
place on probation, or deny reissuance of any
license or the certification of a real estate
school course provider or instructor if at
any time the licensee or certificate holder,
whether acting as an agent or on his own
account, is found guilty of:
(1) making any substantial misrepresentation;
(2) making any false promises of a character
likely to influence, persuade, or induce;
(3) pursuing a continued and flagrant course
of misrepresentation, or of making false
promises through agents, sales agents,
advertising, or otherwise;
(4) acting for more than one party in a
transaction without the informed consent of
all parties;
iv

(5) acting as an associate broker or sales
agent while not licensed with a licensed
principal broker, representing or attempting
to represent a broker other than the
principal broker with whom he is affiliated,
or representing as sales agent or having a
contractual relationship similar to that of
sales agent with other than a licensed
principal broker;
(6) failing, within a reasonable time, to
account for or to remit any monies coming
into his possession which belong to others,
or commingling those funds with his own, or
diverting those funds from the purpose for
which they were received;
(7) paying or offering to pay valuable
consideration, as defined by the commission,
to any person not licensed under this
chapter, except that valuable consideration
may be shared with a licensed principal
broker of another jurisdiction or as provided
under the Professional Corporation Act;
(8) being unworthy or incompetent to act as a
principal broker, associate broker, or sales
agent in such manner as to safeguard the
inter^ts of the public;
(9) failing to voluntarily furnish copies of
all documents to all parties executing the
documents;
(10) failing to keep and make available for
inspection by the division a record of each
transaction, including the names of buyers
and sellers, the identification of the
property, the sale price, any monies received
in trust, any agreements or instructions from
buyers or sellers, and any other information
required by rule;
(11) failing to disclose, in writing, in the
purchase or sale of property, whether the
purchase or sale is made for himself or for
v

an undisclosed principal;
(12) conviction of a criminal offense
involving moral turpitude;
(13) advertising the availability of real
estate or the services of a licensee in a
false, misleading, or deceptive manner;
(14) in the case of a principal broker or a
licensee who is a branch manager, failing to
exercise reasonable supervision over the
activities of his licensees and any
unlicensed staff;
(15) violating or disregarding this chapter,
an order of the commission, or the rules
adopted by the commission and the division;
(16) breaching a fiduciary duty owed by a
licensee to his principal in a real estate
transaction;
(17) any other conduct which constitutes
dishonest dealing; or
(18) unprofessional conduct as defined by
statute or rule.
§ 61-2-12
Disciplinary action - Judicial review
(1) (a) (i) Before imposing a civil penalty,
revoking, suspending, placing on probation,
or reissuance of any license or certificate,
the division shall give notice to the
licensee or certificate holder and schedule
an adjudicative proceeding.
(ii) If the licensee is an active
sales agent or active associate
broker, the division shall inform
the principal broker with whom the
licensee is affiliated of the
charge and of the time and place of
vi

the hearing.
(iii) If after the hearing the
commission determines that any
licensee or certificate holder is
guilty of a violation of this
chapter, the license or certificate
may be suspended, revoked, denied
reissuance, or a civil penalty may
be imposed by written order of the
commission in concurrence with the
director,
(b) If the hearing is delegated by the
commission to an administrative law judge,
and a ruling has been issued by the
commission and the director, the licensee or
certificate holder may request
reconsideration by the commission by filing a
written request stating specific grounds upon
which relief is requested.
(2) (a) Any applicant, certificate holder,
licensee, or person aggrieved, including the
complainant, may obtain judicial review or
agency review by the executive director of
any adverse ruling, order, or decision of the
director and the commission.
(b) If the applicant, certificate holder, or
licensee prevails in the appeal and the court
finds that the state action was undertaken
without substantial justification, the court
may award reasonable litigation expenses to
the applicant, certificate holder, or
licensee as provided under Title 78, Chapter
27a, Small Business Equal Access to Justice
Act.
(c) (i) No order, rule, or decision of the
director and the commission may take effect
until 30 days after the time for appeal to
the court has expired.
(ii) If an appeal is taken by a
licensee, the division shall stay
vii

enforcement of the commission's
action in accordance with the
provisions of Section 63-46b-18.
(iii) The appeal shall be governed
by the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
(3) The commission and the director shall
comply with the procedures and requirementis
of Title 63, Chapter 46b, in their
adjudicative proceedings.
§ 61-2-20
Rights and privileges of sales agent,
associate brokers, and principal brokers.
Real estate licensees may fill out those
forms approved by the Utah Real Estate
Commission and the attorney general and those
forms provided by statute, with the following
exceptions:
(1) principal brokers and associate brokers
may fill out any documents associated with
the closing of a real estate transaction.
(2) Real estate licensees may fill out r£al
estate forms prepared by legal counsel of the
buyer, seller, lessor, or lessee, or any
legal counsel, provided that the Real Estate
Commission and attorney general have not
approved a specific form necessary to that
transaction.
§ 63-46b-10-l(e)
Procedures for formal adjudicative
proceedings - Orders.
In formal adjudicative proceedings:
(1) Within a reasonable time after the
hearing, or after the filing of any post-*
hearing papers permitted by the presiding
viii

officer, or within the time required by any
applicable statute or rule of the agency, the
presiding officer shall sign and issue and
order that includes:
(e) a notice of the right to apply
for reconsideration;
63-46b-12(6)(c)
(6)(c) The order on review shall contain:
(i) a designation of the statute or
rule permitting or requiring
review;
(ii) a statement of the issues
reviewed;
(iii) findings of fact as to each
of the issues reviewed;
(iv) conclusions of law as to each
of the issues reviewed;
(v) the reasons for the
disposition;
(vi) whether the decision of the
presiding officer or agency is to
be affirmed, reversed, or modified,
and whether all or any portion of
the adjudicative proceeding is to
be remanded;
(vii) a notice of any right of
further administrative
reconsideration or judicial review
available to aggrieved parties; and
(viii) the time limits applicable
to any appeal or review.
63-46b-13(l)(a)
(1) (a) Within 20 days after the date that
ix

an order is issued for which review by the
agency or by a superior agency under Section
63-46b-12 is unavailable, and if the order4
would otherwise constitute final agency
action, any party may file a written request
for reconsideration with the agency, stating
the specific grounds upon which relief is
requested.
§ 63-46b-16
Judicial review - Formal adjudicative
proceedings.
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme
Court or the Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction to review all final agency
action resulting from formal adjudicative
proceedings.
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final
agency action resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner
shall file a petition for review of agency
action with the appropriate appellate court
in the form required by the appellate rules
of the appropriate appellate court.
(b) The appellate rules of the
appropriate appellate court shall
govern all additional filings and
proceedings in the appellate court.
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of
the agency's record for judicial review of
formal adjudicative proceedings are governed
by the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
except that:
(a) all parties to the review
proceedings may stipulate to
shorten, summarize, or organize the
record;
(b) the appellate court may tax
the cost of preparing transcripts
x

and copies for the record:
(i) against a party who
unreasonably refuses to
stipulate to shorten,
summarize, or organize
the record; or
(ii) according to any other
provision of law.
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief
only if, on the basis of the agency's record,
to determines that a person seeking judicial
review has been substantially prejudiced by
any of the following:
(a) the agency action, or the
statute or rule on which the agency
action is based, is
unconstitutional on its face or as
applied;
(b) the agency had acted beyond
the jurisdiction conferred by any
statute;
(c) the agency has not decided all
of the issues requiring resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously
interpreted or applied the law;
(e) the agency has engaged in an
unlawful procedure or decisionmaking process, or has failed to
follow prescribed procedure;
(f) the persons taking the agency
action were illegally constituted
as a decision-making body or were
subject to disqualification;
(g) the agency action is based
upon a determination of fact, made
xi

or implied by the agency, that is
not supported by substantial
evidence when viewed in light of
the whole record before the court;
(h)

the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the
discretion delegated to
the agency by statute;
(ii) contrary to a rule
of the agency;
(iii) contrary to the
agency's prior practice,
unless the agency
justifies the
inconsistency by giving
facts and reasons that
demonstrate a fair and
rational basis for the
inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary
or capricious.

§ 78-2a-3(2)(a)
Court of Appeals jurisdiction
The Court of Appeals has appellate
jurisdictionf including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appealsf over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting
from formal adjudicative proceedings of state
agencies or appeals from the district couprt
review of informal adjudicative proceedinigs
of the agencies, except the Public Serviqe
Commission, State Tax Commission, Board of
State Lands, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining,
and the state engineer;
Rules of Appellate Procedure
xii

The record on appeal
(e) The transcript of proceedings; duty of
appellant to order; notice to appellee if
partial transcript is ordered.
(2) Transcript required of all
evidence regarding challenged
finding or conclusion. I the
appellant intends to urge on appeal
that a finding or conclusion is
unsupported by or is contrary to
the evidence, the appellant shall
include in the record a transcript
of all evidence relevant to such
finding or conclusion.
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal of a final order issued by an
administrative agency of the State of Utah following a formal
adjudicative proceeding.

This Court has jurisdiction over this

appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann, §§ 78-2a-3(2)(a) and 63-46b-16.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The Utah Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA"), Utah Code
Ann. § 63-46b-l to -22 (1990), applies to this appeal.

Because

of the number of issues raised by Petitioner on this appeal, the
correct standard of review will be identified with respect to
each issue. Moreover, the issues will be separated according to
the fact pattern or case from which they are being raised on
appeal.
FACT PATTERN I (THE STONES TRANSACTION)
1.

Was the ALJ correct in holding that Krantz violated the

provisions of 61-2-11 by making "any false promises of a
character likely to influence, persuade or induce" in the "Stone"
matter.
Standard of Review; This issue calls for the Division's
application of facts to its own regulations and therefore falls
under an intermediate standard of review.

Under this standard,

the courts will accord the agency decision with deference if it

1

is reasonable and rational. Vali Convalescent & Care Inst, v.
DOH, 797 P.2d 438, 443 (Utah App. 1990).
2.

Was Krantz required to investigate whether or not CSC could

assume the Stone's mortgage before making a promise to assume the
mortgage in exchange for the Stone's promise to purchase a home
from CSC?
Standard of Review; This issue presents a question of fact
which the court will sustain "only if' they are supported by
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record
before the court." Grace Drilling v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d
63, 67 (Utah App. 1989) .
3.

Was the A.L.J.'s erroneous in finding that Krantz's conduct

was reckless in light of the fact that the agreement between the
Stones and CSC contained a condition contingent upon third party
approval and which gave the Stones the option to void the
agreement upon failure of the condition?
Standard of Review: This issue presents a question of fact
which the court will sustain "only if they are supported by
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record
before the court." Grace, at 67.
4.

Does the fact that CSC's obligation to purchase the Stone's

condominium was conditioned upon the approval of a lending
institution to allow CSC to assume the mortgage or obtain
2

alternative financing excuse Krantz from determining first
whether CSC could assume the mortgage before making the promise?
Standard of Review:

This issue presents a mixed question of

fact and law and should be reviewed under an intermediate
standard of review.

Under that standard, the courts will accord

the agency decision with deference if it is reasonable and
rational. Vali at 443.
5.

Did the Stones rely on Krantz's promise to their detriment?
Standard of Review; This issue presents a question of fact

which the court will sustain "only if

they are supported by

substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record
before the court." Grace at 67.
GASTER TRANSACTION
6.

Did the Administrative Law Judge correctly rule that Krantz

committed a misrepresentation by omission by failing to disclose
to the Gaster's at the time of closing that CSC was delinquent in
paying for labor and materials?
Standard of Review:

This issue presents a mixed question of

fact and law and should be reviewed under an intermediate
standard of review.

Under that standard, the courts will accord

the agency decision with deference if it is reasonable and
rational. Vali at 443.
7.

Did the fact that the Gasters were represented by another
3

licensed real estate agent excuse Krantz for his failure to
disclose unpaid bills that could subject the property to
mechanics liens?
Standard of Review; This issue presents a question of fact
which the court will sustain "only if

they are supported by

substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record
before the court." Grace at 67.
8.

Did the administrative law judge incorrectly conclude that

Krantz's failure to disclose the unpaid bills was intentional
despite his also finding that Krantz was not aware of CSC's weak
financial condition until after closing.
Standard of Review; This issue presents a question of fact
which the court will sustain "only if they are supported by
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record
before the court." Grace
9.

at 67.

Did CSC's payment and discharge of the mechanics liens

preclude the administrative law judge from concluding that Krantz
committed a material and substantial misrepresentation?
Standard of Review; This issue presents a question of fact
which the court will sustain "only if

they are supported by

substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record
before the court." Grace
10.

at 67.

Did Krantz owe the Gaster's any duty beyond closing?
4

Standard of Review; This issue presents a question of fact
which the court will sustain "only if

they are supported by

substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record
before the court." Grace

at 67.

11. Was Krantz's failure to use an earnest money sales agreement
approved by the Utah Real Estate Commission and the Utah Attorney
General's Office constitute unprofessional conduct?
Standard of Review:

This issue calls for the Division's

application of facts to its own regulations and therefore falls
under an intermediate standard of review.

Under the intermediate

standard of review, the courts will accord the agency decision
with deference if it is reasonable and rational. Vali at 443.
ALLEGED DUE PROCESS ALLEGATIONS
12. Was Krantz substantially prejudiced by the fact nine months
expired between the date of the hearing the issuance of the order
revoking Krantz's license?
13.

Did the Division's failure to provide Krantz with notice of

a right to request reconsideration violative of Utah Code Ann. §
63-46b-10-l(e)?
14.

Is the decision of the Division Director and the Real Estate

Commission so vague as to render it unenforceable?
15.

Was Krantz deprived of State and Federal Due process by the

Division's failure to provide interpretive rules that put him
5

on

notice of prohibited conduct?
16.

Was Krantz deprived of State and Federal Due process by the

Division's failure to publish summaries of complaint resolutions
so as to allow Krantz to argue that the Division's actions are
contrary to the agency's prior practice?
Standard of Review: This issuers above all present questions
of law which is reviewed for correctness. Grace at 67.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND RULES
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This appeal j-solves two cases arising from separate
petitions that were filed by the Division of Real Estate against
the Petitioner.

The petitions were consolidated and heard

simultaneously on May 29-30, 1991.

For the sake of organization,

the following statement of facts, which have been taken almost
verbatim

from the written findings of fact issued by the

administrative law judge ("ALJ"), will be treated separately.
Case No. RE87-11-19 (Fact Situation II)
THE STONES TRANSACTION
1.

Krantz at all times relevant to this proceedings has

been, the principal broker for Copper State Realty (Referred to
hereafter as "CSR") and president of Copper State Construction (
Referred to hereafter as "CSC"). (R./263)
2.

In late 1987, Robert and Peggy Stone owned a
6

condominium located in Taylorsville, Utah.

Based on a referral

from a co-worker for whom CSC had built a home, the Stones
contacted Max Lloyd, a sales agent affiliated with CSR.

The

Stones and Mr. Lloyd discussed the possible sale of the Stone's
condominium to CSC, coupled with the Stone's purchase of a home
to be constructed by CSC.

Mr. Lloyd introduced the Stones to

Krantz at the CSR office. (R./263)
3.

Pursuant to December 2, 1987, earnest money sales

agreement, CSC offered to purchase the Stone's condominium for
$88,000.

The offer provided for a $100 earnest money deposit,

which had been received by Mr. Lloyd, a $14,400 cash down payment
and the possible assumption by CSC of the Stone's existing
$73,500 mortgage.

The offer was made subject to the following

conditions:
Seller to have the right to market and sell this
property any time prior to completion of their new home
located at (Murray, Utah. Lot #5 Ridge Creek. This
offer is null and void if property is sold to a third
party prior to completion of seller's new home.
The offer further provided that if CSC was required to
assume the Stone's existing mortgage "and/or obtain outside
financing", CSC agreed to use best efforts to do so and the offer
was made subject to CSC's "qualifying for and lending institution
granting said assumption and/or financing".

The offer further

recited that the Vendors, the Stones, could void the agreement
7

upon written notice if CSC failed to qualify or financing or
assumption of the loan.

CSC agreed to apply to assume the

underlying obligation and/or obtain new financing within ten (10)
days after the Stone's acceptance of the offer.

The offer also

recites the transaction would close on or before May 15, 19 87.
Given the date of the earnest money sales agreement, the juststated date is obviously in error, the parties intending the
closing to occur on or before May 15, 1988. (R./263-264)
4.

On December 28, 1987, the Stones made a counter offer,

which provided they would not be liable for any real estate
commissions.

On the just-stated date, the Stones and Krantz—as

president of CSC—executed a December 10, 11987 contract, whereby
the Stones agreed to purchase property located on Lot #5, Ridge
Creek Subdivision in Murray, Utah and further agreed to purchase
a home to be constructed on that property by CSC.

The contract

price was $170,000 and the Stones made a $1,500 deposit toward
payment on the contract.

The just-stated contract was also

subject to the Stones qualifying for financing on the new home.
CSC agreed to start construction on or before December 30, 1987
and complete construction within 145 days from that date.
(R./264)
5.

The document used by the Stones and CSC was not the

standard earnest money sales agreement form for residential
8

construction.

Rather, Krantz had obtained the form contract

which he used from a friend who had-in-turn—obtained it from an
attorney. (R./264)
6.

On December 6,1987, Krantz—on behalf of CSC— accepted

the Stone's counter offer.
deposited to the

The $100 earnest money had been

CSR trust account on December 21, 1987. The

Stones relied on CSC's agreement to purchase their condominium
and assume the existing mortgage when they agreed to purchase the
new home.

The Stones believed if their condominium was not sold

prior to completion of the construction on the new home, CSC
would either assume the existing mortgage on the condominium or
obtain the financing and—in either case—the Stones would no
longer be obligated on the existing mortgage.

However, Krantz

only intended to purchase the home on a simple assumption of the
existing loan, which would have been consistent with CSC's common
and preferred practice when it agreed to build a new home in
trade for an existing residence.(R./264-265)
7.

As of December 29, 1987, the Stones did not know under

what circumstances the existing mortgage on the condominium could
be assumed.

Mr. Lloyd or Krantz neither discussed that matter

with the Stones at that time nor did they ever make any inquiry
of the lender at that time whether the loan could be assumed.
that Mr. Lloyd and Krantz discussed any possible assumption of
9

or

the loan by CSC. (R./265)
8.

In mid-May 1988, the Stones contacted Krantz as their

new home was nearing completion.
been sold by that time.

The Stone's condominium had not

The Stones requested Krantz to undertake

efforts to assume the existing loan on their condominium.

Krantz

informed the Stones that he had only intended to market their
condominium for resale and had only promised to make payments on
the existing mortgage until the condominium was sold and he never
intended to formally assume the existing loan to thus relieve the
Stones from future li^Lility for any pr^arents on that loan.
Thereafter, Krantz—on behalf of CSC—contacted the lender on the
mortgage for the Stone's condominium and was informed CSC could
not purchase the condominium on a simple assumption, due to an
owner occupancy requirement.

When Krantz subsequently offered to

purchase the Stone's condominium on contract, the Stones declined
that offer. (R./265)
9,

The Stones had sought financing from Crossland Mortgage

Company to purchase the new home. Approval of any such financing
was contingent on the sale of the Stone's condominium.

On July

26, 1988, the Stones notified CSC they were terminating the
contract to purchase the new home due to their inability to
obtain financing.

CSC could not formally assume the loan on the

Stone's existing condominium nor was it ever Krantz's intent that
10

CSC would do so.

The Stones refused to sell their condominium to

CSC on a simple assumption because it was never their intent to
do so and they had initially agreed to sell the condominium with
the understanding that only CSC would be thereafter obligated to
make payment in satisfaction of the outstanding indebtedness on
the condominium.
10.

(R./265-266).

On July 26, 1988, the Stones demanded return of both

the $1,500 deposit regarding the new home and the $100 earnest
money deposit CSC had made respecting its' offer to purchase
their condominium.

^he Stones also filed a complaint with the

Salt Lake Board of Realtors.

On August 1, 1988, Krantz received

a notice from the Salt Lake Board of Realtors concerning that
complaint.

In late August or early September 1988, proceedings

wee conducted before a Board arbitration committee.

On October

10, 1988, the Stones and CSC reached an agreement, whereby the
latter would return the $1,500 deposit paid by the Stones and the
Stones executed a release of the $100 earnest money. (R./266)
Case No. RE89-03-12
THE GASTER TRANSACTION
1.

The findings of fact previously set forth in Paragraph

1 of Case No. RE87-11-19 (Factual Statement II) are incorporated
herein by reference.(R./272)
2.

As of January 1988, James and Valerie Gaster owned a
11

house located at 7588 Dover Hill Drive in Salt Lake City, Utah.
Approximately two (2) years earlier, the Gasters had listed that
property for sale through Terry Hill-Black, a real estate sales
agent.

Mrs. Gaster initially contacted Krantz in late 1987 and

she generally inquired about a possible trade of the Gaster home
for another residence.

Mrs. Gaster also contacted Mq. Hill-Black

about a possible trade of properties in that regard.(R./272)
3.

Mr. Gaster saw an advertisement by CSR and he

specifically contacted Krantz to inquire about a traqe of the
Gaster residence for a new home. Mr. Gaster met with Krantz in
late January or early February 1988 and Krantz saw the Gaster
home, which was available for sale by owner at that time. Ms.
Hill-Black accompanied the Gasters when they saw a new homef
located at 358 E. Bridlewalk Lane in Murray, Utah, built by CSC.
(R./272)
4.

On February 9, 1988, the Gasters offered to' purchase

the Bridlewalk Lane property from CSC for $189,000.
Black, who was affiliated with Gump & Ayers

Ms. Hill-

Real Estate, Inc.,

represented the Gasters and she prepared that earnest money sales
agreement, which provided the Gasters would apply for financing
through Crossland Mortgage Corporation.(R./272)
5.

On February 9, 1988, CSC offered to purchase the

Gaster's home for $102,000. Ms. Hill-Black prepared that earnest
12

money sales agreement at Krantz's direction, but it was Krantz
who represented the Gasters as their agent in that transaction.
Krantz, acting as principal broker for CSR, receipted the earnest
money deposit on that offer and he signed the offer in his
capacity as president of CSC.(R./272)
6.

The just-described offer, which provided CSC would

assume the $83,000 existing mortgage on the Gaster's home, was
also made subject to the following conditions:
Seller to have the right to market or sell property any
time prior to completion of home located at 358 E.
Bridlewalk Lane, if home is sold prior to completion of
buyer's new home, this offer is null & void.
On February 10, 1988, the Gasters accepted the offer.

Five

days later, the Gasters entered into a listing agreement with
CSR, whereby the Dover Hill Drive property was listed for sale at
$94,000.(R./272-273)
7.

Sparing detail, addendums to both offers were executed

on March 15, 1988, whereby the sale price on the Dover Hill Drive
and Bridlewalk Lane properties were reduced to $94,000 and
$181,000, respectively.

The sale of each property was scheduled

to close on April 1, 1988. The Gasters applied for a
conventional mortgage through Crossland Mortgage Corporation to
purchase the Bridlewalk Lane property.

Proof of the Gaster's

sale of their home was a necessary condition to the financing on
their purchase of the Bridlewalk Lane property. (R./273)
13

8.
21, 1988.

The closing on each transaction was conducted on April
Krantz, Ms. Hill-Black and the Gasters were among

those present at that time.
as president of CSC.

Krantz signed the closing statements

Both Gump & Ayers Real Estate, Inc. and CSR

shared the commission on the sale of the Bridlewalk Lane
property.

Mr. Gaster executed a warranty deed to CSC, whereby

the latter assumed and agreed to pay an all-inclusive trust deed
with a current principle balance of $82,988.24 in favor of a Dean
C. Burnham and Charlotte L. Beeson.

Copies of the settlement

statement and the warranty deed on the sale of the Dover Hill
Drive property were submitted to Crossland Mortgage Corporation
as proof of the sale of that property.

Crossland Mortgages

Corporation closed the loan on the Gaster's purchase of the
Bridlewalk Lane property in reliance on those documents. (R./27 3)
9.

Krantz reasonably believed CSC would be able to make

the necessary payments when CSC purchased the Dover Hill Drive
property.

However, several homes which CSC had contracted to

build were not timely completed between sometime in April 1988
through June 1988 and various closings on newly constructed homes
were delayed or did not occur during that time.

Consequently,

CSC lacked the funds necessary to satisfy payments due on the
Dover Hill Drive property.(R./273-274)
10.

Sometime between April 1988 and June 14, 1988, three
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liens were filed on the Bridlewalk Lane property by
subcontractors and suppliers for non-payment of services and
materials provided during the construction of that house.
Specifically, a $244 lien was filed sometime in April 1988 for
garage doors which had been installed.

This record does not

reflect exactly when that lien was filed.

A $4,133 lien was

filed on April 22, 1988 for materials provided by Jordan Home
Builders and a $2,980 lien was filed on June 14, 1988 for labor
and materials provided by Prows Plastering.

Krantz did not

inform the Gasters at closing that ar * subc

tractors or

materialmen had not been paid.

CSC subsequently made payments to

satisfy the just-described liens, although this record does not
reflect when those payments were made. (R./274)
11.
1988.

CSC's first payment on the trust deed note was June 1,

Ms. Beeson contacted Mr. Gaster and informed him no

payment had been made.

The latter then required on Krantz, who

indicated the payment had been made, but not properly credited.
There is no substantial evidence any such payment was made.
Approximately one month later, Mr. Gaster became aware still no
payments had been made.

Mr. Gaster then contacted Krantz, who

indicated he would attempt to make the necessary payments.
(R./274)
12.

On September 4, 1988, a notice of default was recorded
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which reflected a $4,705 delinquency for non-payment from June
through September 1988-

On February 7, 1989, notice was issued

of a trustee sale to be conducted with respect to the Dover Hill
Drive property.

The Gasters subsequently paid $8,750 to

relinquish all claims and avoid foreclosure on that property.
(R./274)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1. KRANTZ'S FAILURE TO MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE PRECLUDES
HIM FROM CONTESTING FACTUAL FINDINGS BY THE ALJ.
Krantz contests numerous factual findings in his brief but
has failed to provide a transcript or marshall the evidence
sufficient to sustain his arguments on this appeal.

Krantz

contests the factual findings of the ALJ with respect to numerous
issues that are factual and not legal in nature.
For example, Krantz contests the ALJ's findings in the
Stone's transactions that he acted recklessly (Brief at 24); or
that the Stones could reasonably rely on his promise (Brief at
25); and finally that the Stones could not have suffered any
detriment by his representations (Brief at 26).
Krantz also challenges the factual findings of the ALJ with
regards to the Gaster transaction.

He specifically challenges

the ALJ's findings that the Gaster's reasonably relied on him as
their agent (Brief at 28) and that he owed them a duty.
By his failure to provide a complete record and marshall all
16

of the evidence Krantz is precluded from contesting the ALJ's
factual findings and the court should presume that the ALJ's
findings are supported by substantial evidence.

State v.

Christofferson, 793 P.2d 944, 946, 947 (Utah App. 1990).
2. KRANTZ OWED MORE THE STONES MORE THAN A DUTY TO ACT IN
GOOD FAITH,
Krantz contends that his sole duty to the Stone was to act
in good faith (Brief at p.20).

Given the court's pronouncements

on the subject, the Division maintains that as a licensed real
estate broker, Krantz owe both the Stones and the Gasters a duty
of honesty, integrity, truthfulness and competency. Dugan v.
Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1246 (Utah 1980).

Krantz had a duty to

investigate to determine first under what, if any circumstances,
CSC could assume the Stones mortgage before promising to assume
it if the Stones could not find another buyer within a stated
period.

Krantz failure to do so constitutes violation of section

61-2-11(2)(making a false promise). Utah Code Ann.§ (1988).
3. KRANTZ'S MISREPRESENTATIONS TO THE GASTERS ARE NO
EXCUSED BY THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE ANOTHER AGENT.
Krantz owed a duty as a licensed real estate broker
regardless of the involvement of the other agent in the
transaction.

His failure to disclose the existence of

outstanding debts for labor and material on the home purchased by
the Gasters constituted a serious breach of his duty as a
17

licensee- Dugan at 1246.

This applies with equal weight to

Krantz misrepresentation after the date of closing.
Krantz cannot excuse his own conduct because another agent
failed to find out about and protect the Gaster's interest
against Krantz's misrepresentation.

Moreover, the language of

61-2-11 applies to Krantz whether he is acting as agent "or on
his own account." Utah Code Ann. § (1988).
4. KRANTZ USED AN UNAUTHORIZED FORM IN STONES TRANSACTION
It is uncontroverted that the form used by Krantz in the
Stones transaction was not

oproved by the Commission or by the

Attorney General's Office.

The Division interpretation of the

section 61-2-20 is that it allows licensees to conduct
transactions which do not constitute the unauthorized practice of
law.

Krantz's interpretation that it is merely a permissive

provision runs contrary to that intcmt.
5. THE NINE MONTH DELAY IN ISSUING ORDER DID NOT
PREJUDICE KRANTZ
Krantz was not harmed by the nine month delay in the
issuance of the order in this matter.

His license was not

restricted during pendency of order and as it has is not
restricted during this appeal.

6.

KRANTZ ONLY HAS ONE LICENSE.

The order of the Division revoking Krantz's license has
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taken the only license Krantz has. The revocation does not
demote Krantz from broker to sales agent. Consequently, the final
order of the Commission and the Division does not expand the
scope of the recommended order issued by the ALJ.
7. KRANTZ DOES NOT HAVE A RIGHT TO RECONSIDERATION
Section 63-46b-13 provides that the right of agency
reconsideration is available only when a right of review by the
agency or by a superior agency is not. Utah Code Ann. § (1989).
Krantz misconstrued section 63-46b-10(l)(e) and 12(6)(c) by
failing to read it in conjunction with section 63-46b-13.
8. THE DIVISION PUBLISHES DISCIPLINARY ACTION
The division has published newsletters reviewing
disciplinary action taken against licensees for the past ten
years.

Krantz's argument that the Division failed to give him

the opportunity to determine whether the agency was being
consistent is without merit.
9. THE DIVISION DOES NOT HAVE A DUTY TO PROVIDE
COMPREHENSIVE REGULATION.
Krantz's argument that the Division's rules do not provide
adequate notice is without merit.

Krantz as well as other

licensees are capable of understanding the standards which govern
their profession.

The Division cannot possibly promulgate rules

which cover every conceivable ethical or professional dilemma. In
Re Topik, 761 P.2d 32 (Utah App. 1988).
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ARGUMENT
I. KRANTZ IS PRECLUDED FROM CONTESTING THE FACTUAL
FINDINGS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
On August 21, 1992, Krantz certified with this Court, that
no transcript would be requested in this case. (Exhibit "A").
Moreover, although the Division filed a certified record of all
exhibits, pleadings and orders for purposes of this review,
Krantz has determined that only a handful of exhibits are
necessary to support his contentions (which are abundant) on this
appeal. (Brief at addendum A-G).

Because of Krantz's failure to

provide, this court with a complete record and to marshall all of
the evidence both supportive and contrary to Krantz's position,
Krantz should be precluded from contesting the factual findings
of the administrative law judge.
Upon reviewing Krantz's brief, it is clear that Krantz
repeatedly disputes and in a few instances mischaracterizes
several of the factual findings issued by the Division. Krantz
also makes several findings of his own that are neither cited to
nor based upon the record.

A few of Krantz's statements are

entirely inaccurate and contradictory to the findings issued by
the administrative law judge.
The instances in which Krantz has either contested the ALJ's
factual findings without marshalling the evidence, or has
mischaracterized or added findings that are not found in the
20

record are scattered throughout his brief.

What follows are

those instances in which the Division claims that Krantz has
challenged a factual finding of the ALJ without adequate support
in the record or without marshalling all of evidence.
1. KRANTZ CANNOT THE ALJ'S FINDING THAT KRANTZ ACTED
RECKLESSLY IN THE STONES TRANSACTION.
Krantz contests the ALJ's findings that he acted recklessly
by failing to determine whether CSC could assume the Stone's
mortgage.

Krantz's only basis for challenging the ALJ's finding

is that the earnest money agreement between CSC and the Stones
was contingent upon third party approval. (Brief at 24) Krantz's
failure to marshall all of the evidence both in support of, and
contrary to his position deprives the court of the ability to
review this finding under the substantial evidence standard of
review.
Krantz cites a Utah Court of Appeals decision in First
National Bank of Boston v. County Board of Equalization of Salt
Lake County, for the proposition that an "agency's decision must
not be 'a creation of fiat."' 799 P.2d 1163f 1166 (Utah App.
1990)(Brief at 24). In Boston, the Utah Tax Commission conducted
proceedings to determine the proper tax assessment on property
owned by Boston First National. IdL at 1164. On appeal, the
amount of the assessment was the only matter challenged by Boston
First National.

Because the assessment involved a question of
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fact, the court reviewed the Commission's finding under the
substantial evidence test. JEd.. at 1165.
In applying the substantial evidence test, the court
explained that it was required to "consider both the evidence
that supports the Tax Commission's factual findings and the
evidence that detracts from its findings." Jld. Moreover the
court observed, "Nevertheless the party challenging the
findings -in this case the taxpayer-must marshall all of the
evidence supporting the findings and show that despite the
supporting facts, the Tr>x Commission's findir^j are not supported
by substantial evidence." Id.
The court overturned the Tax Commission's decision because
"nothing in the record indicates how the Tax Commission arrived
at the figures for expenses." JTci. Boston First National met that
burden.

J[ci. It was the Commission's failure to provide support

its conclusion with "some sound evidentiary basis" that led the
court to characterize the Commission's finding as a "creation of
fiat." Id. at 1166.
Krantz, has not marshalled the evidence, which primarily
involved two days of oral testimony and numerous exhibits.
(R./257).

He therefore is in a poor position to characterize the

ALJ's decision as 'a creation of fiat.'
2. KRANTZ CANNOT CONTEST THE ALJ'S FINDING THAT THE
STONE'S RELIANCE ON KRANTZ WAS REASONABLE.
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Second, Krantz asserts that the Stone's reliance on
Krantz's promise was unreasonable. (Brief at 25)

This assertion

is contrary to the finding of the ALJ "that the Stones acted
reasonably and in ignorance of whether their loan on the
condominium could be assumed by CSC." (R./269).

Krantz claims

that because the mortgage was on the Stone's condominium that
they were in a better position than Krantz to know the terms
under which it could be assumed by CSC (Brief at 25) Krantz
further argues that the Stones knew their loan was assumable
because

hey held it out as being assumable with another agent.

Ld.
Krantz's contentions are without merit.

First, Krantz fails

to recognize that the ALJ's conclusion was not simply based on
the failure of CSC qualify for a simple assumption of the Stone's
mortgage.

The ALJ found that the Stone's mortgage could not be

assumed by CSC under any circumstances because of an
owner/occupant requirement. (R./265).

Second, there are no facts

in the record, or any cited by Krantz, that would demonstrate
contrary to the ALJ's finding that the Stones acted reasonably
and in ignorance of whether CSC could assume their mortgage.

The

fact that the Stones held out through another listing that their
loan was assumable is irrelevant and does not support Krantz's
assertion.

The loan was assumable, but not by CSC because of an
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owner/occupant requirement.

The point is that Krantz's failure

to marshall all of the evidence deprives the Court of the ability
to determine what the whole record would reveal on this issue.
3. KRANTZ CANNOT CHALLENGE THE ALJ'S FINDING THAT THE
STONE'S SUFFERED HARM.
The last factual issue contested by Krantz in the Stones
transaction is the ALJ's finding that the Stones suffered harm as
a result of his actions.

(Brief at 26) Most disturbing is the

fact that Krantz offers his own version of the facts without so
much as a citation to the record or an exhibit, or any
explanation why his findings are inverse to the findings made by
the ALJ.
Krantz represents to this court, "that the Stones and Krantz
submitted their claims regarding the* $100 earnest money deposit
to arbitration, and the award was to Krantz." (Brief at 26).
Krantz then concludes, "The conclusion of the arbitration panel
that the deposit should be awarded to Krantz and the release of
Krantz from further liability should be determinative that the
Stones were not damaged in the transactions, and the Judge erred
to Krantz's substantial prejudice in concluding otherwise."
(Brief at 26-27)
There is not a single citation to the record nor support in
the record for Krantz's bald assertions.

The findings of the

ALJ, who received two days of testimony and viewed the exhibits,
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is that the Stones demanded return of their $1,500 deposit and
$100 earnest money deposit CSC had made respecting their offer to
purchase the Stone's condominium. (R./266) The Stones also filed
a complaint with the Salt Lake Board of Realtors in August or
September of 1988. Id. On October 10, 1988, the Stones and CSC
reached an agreement, where CSC agreed to return the $1,500
deposit to the Stones and the Stones executed a release of the
$100 earnest money.(emphasis added) Id.
The ALJ's findings of fact with respect to the harm suffered
by cli^ Stones conflicts with Krantz's version of events.
Krantz's rendition of the facts is entirely lacking in support in
the record.

Moreover, Krantz's failure to provide a transcript

and otherwise marshall the evidence surrounding this issue and
the other factual issues discussed above, preclude him from
contesting the ALJ's factual findings.

The ALJ's findings of

fact are entitled to a presumption that they are adequately
supported by substantial evidence.
4. KRANTZ IS PRECLUDED FROM CONTESTING THE FACTUAL
FINDINGS OF THE ALJ IN THE GASTERS TRANSACTION.
Krantz contests two factual findings involving the Gaster
transaction.

First, Krantz argues that he did not owe a duty to

the Gasters because they were represented by the their own agent.
(Brief at 28). The Gaster's agent, according to Krantz, bore the
sole responsibility for his failure to disclose to the Gasters
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that there were outstanding debts owing for materials and labor
on the home constructed by CSC and sold to the Gasters. (R./275)
Krantz argues that the Gaster's agent had the duty to inquire of
Krantz at the time of closing whether there were any outstanding
debts for labor or materials.

(Brief at 28)

Krantz also asserts that the other agent had a duty to
assure that the agreement between CSC and the Gasters contained
an "extended title insurance protecting against mechanics liens."
(Brief at 28). In essence, Krantz asserts that Gaster's agent
had a duty to protect them from Krantz's misrepresentations.
What Krantz fails to mention is that ALJ specifically found
that Krantz was acting all times relative to this transaction as
an agent to the Gasters. (R./272)

Krantz, acting as the

principal broker of CSR, represented the Gasters in the sale of
the Gaster's home to CSC (R./272). Krantz also received the
earnest money deposit on CSC's offer and signed on CSC's
behalf.(R./272)

Krantz was acting as an agent to the Gasters on

the date he failed to disclose to them that there were
outstanding debts for labors and materials on the home the
Gaster's were purchasing. (R./273-274).
Krantz's blatant disregard for the record prevents the court
from conducting an appropriate review.

Krantz has not met his

burden due to his failure to marshall the evidence.
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5. KRANTZ CANNOT CHALLENGE THE ALJ'S FINDING THAT HIS
MISREPRESENTATION TO THE GASTERS WAS INTENTIONAL.
Krantz asserts that the ALJ's finding, that he intentionally
failed to disclose the existence of unpaid bills at closing on
sale of the new home to the Gasters (R./275-276) was inconsistent
with the ALJ's finding that Krantz was not aware of CSC's
"perilous financial condition" until after the closing. (Brief at
29)(R./275)
The ALJ's finding, that Krantz was aware of unpaid bills at
the time of closing, is entirely different from the conclusion
that Krantz was unaware of the financial condition of CSC.
Perhaps a transcript of the testimony would have shed more light
on this issue.

Absent a transcript or complete record, the court

is left to speculate on the issue of intent.

An exercise, as I

will argue below, the court should decline to become involved
with.
II. THE COURT SHOULD PRESUME THE FACTUAL FINDINGS OF
THE ALJ ARE SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
As the appellant, Krantz carries the burden of marshalling
the evidence that demonstrates the Division's findings of fact,
conclusions of law and order are clearly erroneous. A petitioner
challenging an agency's factual findings must separately marshall
the evidence that supports and contradicts the findings of the
agency in order to obtain appellate review under the Utah
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Administrative Procedure Act's "substantial evidence in light of
the whole record" standard of review.

Johnson-Bowles v. Division

of Securities, 829 P.2d 101, 107 (Utah App. 1992), Heinecke v.
Dep't of Commerce, 810 P.2d 459 (Utah App. 1991).
Simply put, Krantz has a duty to "see that the record
contains the materials necessary to support his appeal

State v.

Christofferson, 793 P.2d 944, 946, 947 (Utah App. 1990)(Absent
record or transcript supporting defendant's factual contentions
on appeal, court presumes that the ruling is adequately
supported), and see, Sawyers v. Sawyers, 558 P.2d 607, 608 (Utah
197 6)(Supreme Court can not resolve or undertake to determine
appeals involving factual matters without a transcript of the
testimony.)
Rule 11(e)(2) of the Utah Rules of Appellate procedure
provides, "If the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a
finding or conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to the
evidence, the appellant shall include in the record a transcript
of all evidence relevant to such finding or conclusion." (1992).
The Utah Court of Appeals has explained that it can only presume
that a judgment was supported by sufficient evidence where the
appellant failed to provide all relevant evidence on appeal.
State v. Nine Thousand One Hundred Ninety Nine Dollars, 791 P.2d
213 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
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Krantz does not have the luxury of raising numerous factual
issues before the court and then providing his own rendition of
the facts.

It is inappropriate to place so many factual issues

in dispute without making the appropriate citations to the record
or without marshalling all of the evidence that both supports and
contradicts the appellant's position.

Uckerman v. Lincoln Nat'l

Life Ins Co., 588 P.2d 142 (Utah 1978)(Court need not, and will
not consider any facts not properly cited to, or supported by the »
record).
Consequently, the Division requests rhat the court presume
for the sake of this appeal that all of the findings of fact
issued by the ALJ and confirmed and adopted by the Utah Real
Estate Commission and the Division Director, are supported by
substantial evidence.
III. KRANTZ IS GUILTY OF MAKING A FALSE PROMISE TO THE
STONES.
1. Standard of Review
Before arguing on this issue on the merits, it is necessary
for this court to first determine which standard of review to
apply in reviewing the Division's rulings on this issue.
"Different standards apply to different aspects of administrative
adjudications."

Vali, 797 P.2d 438, 443 (Utah App.1990).

When

reviewing the factual findings of an agency, the court will not
upset the agency's findings so long as they are "based upon any
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evidence of substance." Savage Industries v. State Tax Comm'n,
811 P.2d 664, SSI

(Utah 1991),

When reviewing an agency's

application of its statutory standards or regulations to the
facts or when an agency construes a statutory terms, it becomes a
somewhat difficult exercise to determine the appropriate standard
to follow.
Issues not involving solely questions of fact are
characterized routinely as either being "questions of law" and
"mixed questions of law and fact".

Sparing a in depth analysis

on the subject, the TJr*h Supreme Court recently announced that
which standard of review to apply to an agency's interpretation
or application of statutory provisions, turns less on the
characterization of the issue as being either a question of law
or mixed question of fact and law and more on the question of how
much deference should be accorded the agency's decision.

Morton

Intern.,Inc. v. Auditing Div., 814 P.2d 581, 586-87 (Utah 1991).
In Morton the Utah Supreme Court reviewing the decision of the
Utah Tax Commission observed,
We do not defer to the commission when construing
statutory terms or when applying statutory terms to the
facts unless the construction of the statutory language
or the application of the law to the facts should be
subject to the Commission's expertise gleaned from its
accumulated practical, first-hand experience with the
subject matter.
Id. at 587.
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Based on the foregoing, the ALJ's ruling with respect to
Krantz's violation of section 61-2-11, and other statutoryviolations, would be reviewed by this court as either a question
of law or a mixed question of law fact depending on the court's
application of the criteria established under Morton.
The Division's interpretation of the language found in 61-211 should be accorded deference by this court.

In Rogers v.

Division of Real Estate, 790 P.2d 102 (Utah App. 1990), this
court reviewed under the intermediate standard of review, the
o;"ier of the Division of Real Estate revoking the license of the
appellant based upon their finding that Rogers was guilty of
section 61-2-11(8) (being "worthy and incompetent").
By virtue of the experience and expertise of the Commission
and the broad grant of authority delegated to the Division and
Commission, the Division's and Commission's interpretation
section 61-2-11, and other statutory provisions, should be
accorded substantial deference and should be reviewed under the
intermediate standard of review for reasonableness and
rationality.

1. KRANTZ'S CHALLENGE TO THE ALJ'S FACTUAL FINDINGS
REQUIRES THE COURT TO APPLY THE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
TEST TO THE DECISION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
Contrary to Krantz's characterization of issues in the
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Standard of Review section in his brief (Brief at 4-6), it is
evident from Krantz's arguments that he disputes the ALJ's and
the Division's findings of fact and not the ALJ's application of
the statute, section 61-2-11, to those facts. (Brief at 23 - 27).
Although the Division's interpretation of 61-2-11 should be
reviewed under the intermediate standard of review, the court
should presume, based on the Division's arguments raised above,
that the ALJ's findings of fact are supported by substantial
evidence.

Krantz's characterization of an issue as being either

a question of law or mixed question of fact and law should be
accorded no deference.

Krantz does not challenge the Division's

interpretation of or application of section 61-2-11.

Instead,

Krantz challenges the ALJ's findings of fact.
For example, Krantz argues that he did not act recklessly in
the Stones transaction (Brief at 23) and that the Stones reliance
on his promise was "unreasonable. (Brief at 25)

Krantz also

argues that the "Stones suffered no harm." (Brief at 26). All of
theses issues pose questions of fact that should be reviewed by
the court under the substantial evidence (based on the whole
record) standard of review.1

l

.
As questions of fact, Krantz's arguments should be
rejected on the grounds discussed above.
Krantz's failure to
marshall the evidence and provide this court with a complete record
preclude him from contesting the ALJ's factual findings.
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2. KRANTZ FAILURE TO DETERMINE WHETHER CSC COULD ASSUME
THE STONES MORTGAGE CONSTITUTES A FALSE PROMISE.
The ALJ's conclusion that Krantz made a false promise of a
character likely to "influence, persuade or induce" was based on
his finding that underlying facts satisfied certain elements of
intentional or fraudulent misrepresentation as stated in several
court decisions.

Those elemencs were explained in Dugan v. Jones

as follows:
(1) a representation;(2)concerning a presently existing
material fact; (3) which was false; (4) which the
representor either (a) knew to be false, or (b) made
recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient knowledge
upon which to Dat>e such representation; (5) for the
purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it; (6)
that the other party acting reasonably and in Ignorance
of its falsity; (7) did in fact rely upon it; '8) to
his injury or damage*
615 P.2d 1239, 1246 (Utah 1980), see also, Nikkelson v. Quail
Valley Realty, 641 P.2d 124, 126 (Utah 1982); Secor v. Knight,
716 P.2d 790, 794 (Utah 1986).

The ALJ found that there was

substantial and credible evidence supporting the conclusion that
Krantz made a false promise to Stones under the elements set
forth in Dugan.

(R./268-269).

The ALJ found that Krantz made a

representation to the Stones when he promised to assume their
mortgage in the event the Stone's could not find another buyer.
The ALJ also found that Krantz acted recklessly because he failed
to determine under "what—if any—circumstances the loan could be
assumed."(R./268) The ALJ also expressly found that the Stone's
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reliance on Krantz was reasonable and that they were unaware of
whether their loan could be assumed by CSC. (R./269)

The ALJ

also found that the Stone's suffered harm as a result of Krantz's
representation. (R./2 6 9)
3.

KRANTZ HAD MORE THAN A DUTY TO ACT IN GOOD FAITH.

Krantz contends that his sole duty to the Stones was to act
in good faith when making the offer to assume the Stone's
mortgage. (Brief at p.20) Krantz's argument and his reliance on
Cerritos Trucking Co. v. Utah Venture No. 1, 645 P.2d 608 (Utah
*1982) for support of his contention are without merit.
In Cerritos, the defendant, a owner of a warehouse, was sued
by the plaintiffs for damages and specific performance of an
option to purchase the defendant's warehouse. Id.. The defendant
counter-sued on the basis of intentional and negligent
misrepresentation claiming that the plaintiffs misrepresented to
him that a third party, Fiber Sciences, planned to participate in
the purchase and acquisition of the warehouse. Id,, at 611

The

defendant argued that the price he agreed to under the option
agreement was based on the plaintiff's representation that Fiber
Sciences would participate in the purchase of the warehouse. Id.
The defendant claimed that he was motivated to lower the price of
the option based on a desire to curry favor with Fiber Sciences
for the sake future business dealings with the company. Jld. at
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610.

The trial court granted plaintiffs and directed verdict and

dismissed the defendant's claim. Jjd. at 611.
The Cerritos court affirmed the trial court's directed
verdict.

The court ruled that with respect to the defendant's

claim of intentional misrepresentation, that there was a lack of
any evidence that the plaintiffs had not intention of keeping
their agreement at the time it was made. Iji. The defendant also
claimed

that the plaintiff's engaged in a negligent

misrepresentation by failing to first obtain a legal opinion that
should have revealed a conflict of interest (whiuh latter
evolved) which precluded Fiber Sciences from participating in the
acquisition of the warehouse. .Id. The court noted, the
defendant's reliance on Dugan as well as other cases in support
of his legal argument that all of the elements of negligent
misrepresentation were present. Id. at 612.
The Cerritos court rejected defendant's application of Dugan
and other cases on the basis that: "In those cases-the
representation which was allegedly negligently made was a
representation as to a past or present fact." j[d. The court then
observed that there was no case law to support the defendant's
proposition that negligent misrepresentation should be extended
"to fact situations involving a person's [fiber science's] state
of mind." Ld.

At the time the plaintiff made the
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misrepresentation to the defendant there did not exist a bona
fide intention to participate in the purchase. Id.
Cerritos can be distinguished from the Stone's transaction
on the basis that Krantz's representation to assume the stones
mortgage did involve a reckless misrepresentation of a presently
existing material fact.

Despite Krantz's argument that the

contingent nature of the agreement excuses the inaccuracy of his
representation, he misses the point.

Krantz was not found to

have intentionally misrepresented the facts to the Stones.
(R./268) In fact the ALJ expressly found that Krantz and the
Stones did not share a common intent over the manner in which CSC
would assume the loan. (R./268)

The Stone's anticipated that the

assumption would be a formal assumption while the Krantz and CSC
intended to assume the loan by a simple assumption. (R./264)
Therefore, the mental state, or Krantz's good faith did not bear
any relevance to the ALJ's decision.
Krantz false promise to the Stones is not predicated on the
failure of a condition to transpire, but the impossibility of the
condition to transpire at the outset of the transaction. His
failure to inquire of the loan's assumability resulted in the
failure of the transaction and the resultant harm to the Stones.
As a licensed real estate broker, Krantz owed a duty to the
Stones to inquire first whether CSC could assume the Stone's
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mortgage.

By virtue of his training, experience and licensure,

Krantz is held to higher standard than that of mere good faith.
He is also required to act competently while conducting himself
as a trained professional in the real estate business.

"The law

imposes upon [Krantz] a duty to reasonably assure the accuracy of
what he represents, because of his superior position to obtain
the needed knowledge and his pecuniary interest in the
transaction." Galloway v. AFCO Development Corp., 777 P.2d 506,
509 (Utah App. 1989.), Duqan at 1248. (a real estate agent is
expected to be competent ar^ is answerable for beaches of
statutory duty owed to the public.)
Krantz is also not excused of his failure to inquire into
the assumability of the Stone's loan because the Stone's had the
option to void the transaction in the event, CSC could not assume
the loan.

The Stone's did in fact exercise their prerogative to

void the agreement, but only because they could not qualify to
purchase the home constructed by CSC due to their continued
indebtedness on their existing mortgage on the condominium.
(R./265)
Krantz's breach of his professional standards as a real
estate broker in the Stone's transaction served as an appropriate
basis to enter a sanction against his license.

The Division

requests that the court uphold the decision of the Division
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revoking Krantz's license to practice real estate.
IV. KRANTZ MADE AN INTENTIONAL MISREPRESENTATION IN
THE GASTER TRANSACTION.
In the Gaster transactions, the ALJ found that Krantz made
two misrepresentations by omission.

Like the Stones transaction,

the facts in the Gaster transaction involved two separate
agreements between the Gasters and CSC.

The Gasters entered into

an agreement wherein Krantz acted as the Gaster's agent in the
sale of the Gaster home to CSC. (R./272)

The Gaster's agreed in

turn to purchase a home constructed by CSC

The Gasters were

represented in that transaction by an real estate agent referred
to as Ms. Hill-Black. (R./272)
The ALJ found that Krantz first misrepresentation occurred
at closing on April 21, 1988. (R./273).

Both transactions, the

sale the Gaster's home to CSC, and the purchase of the new home
constructed by CSC were closed on that date. (R./27 3) With
respect to the closing on the Gaster's closing, the ALJ found
that there were unpaid bills for labor and materials on the home
constructed by CSC and Krantz intentionally failed to disclose
the existence of the unpaid bills at the time of closing.
(R./275).

Shortly after the closing, two liens were attached to

the Gaster's home. (R./274).

The liens were subsequently

discharged by CSC. Id.
The second misrepresentation was found to have occurred
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around June 1, 1988 when the first payment on the trust deed note
was not paid.(R./274)

When Mr. Gaster learned that payment on

the note was delinquent he contacted Krantz who indicated that
payment was made but not properly credited. (R./274)

The ALJ

expressly found that there was no substantial evidence to support
Krantz's statement that payment was made. (R./274) A month later
Mr. Gaster

contacted Krantz a second time about payments not

being made on the note.

Krantz again represented that he would

attempt to make the payments. (R./274).

As a result of Krantz's

misrepresentations and CSC's failure to make the necessary
payments on the trust deed note, the Gasters were required to pay
$8/750 to avoid foreclosure on the home and to relinquish all
claims against the property. (R./274).
1. INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER AGENT DOES NOT EXCUSE KRANTZ
Krantz attempts to excuse his conduct on the assertion that
Ms. Hill-Black, who acted as the Gaster's agent at the closing
the purchase of the new home, should have protected the Gaster's
from the possibility of mechanics liens.

Essentially, Krantz is

placing the blame on Ms. Hill Black for his misrepresentation.
Krantz's assertion is without merit for three reasons.
First, it difficult to fathom how Krantz can charge Ms. Black
with a duty to discover what he, as a licensed broker, already
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had actual knowledge of.2 Krantz was also was acting as an
agent to the Gasters in the sale of their home to CSC.

By his

argument, Krantz is admitting that he had a conflict of interest
between his duty to the Gasters as their agent and CSC.

Krantz

reacted to his dual by choosing not to reveal the unpaid bills to
the Gasters (to their detriment).
Second, Krantz's argument is totally inconsistent with the
appellate court's ruling in several cases starting with Duqan.
In this state, it is apparent that the rule of
caveat emptor does not apply to those dealing with a
licensed real estate agent. Though not occupying a
fiduciary relationship with prospective purchasers, a
real estate agent hired by the vendor is expected to be
honest, ethical, and competent and is answerable at law
for breaches of his or her statutory duty to the
public.
Duqan at 1248.; Secor v. Knight, 716 P.2d 790, 795 (Utah 1986);
Rogers v. Division of Real Estate. 790 P.2d 102, 107 (Utah App.
1990).

The legislature as seen fit to impose upon real estate

licensees the duty to act honestly and ethically regardless of
whether acting as an agent or "on his own account." Utah Code
2

. Krantz argues that the ALJ held that Krantz was not aware
of CSC's perilous financial situation until after closing. Krantz
presumes that the ALJ's conclusion in that regard contradicts his
later finding that Krantz's failure to disclose unpaid bills was
intentional. While it is true that the ALJ found that Krantz was
unaware of CSC's financial problems until after the closing, this
is entirely different than the finding that Krantz new that bills
for labor and materials on the Gaster home had not been paid for.
This is yet another example where Krantz has failed to marshall the
evidence to support his argument.
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Ann. § 61-2-11 (1988).

Krantz is neither excused by the fact

that another agent was involved in the transaction nor by the
assertion that his fiduciary obligation to the Gaster's
terminated upon closing. (Brief at 31 and 34).
Krantz further argues that any representation he made was
not substantial because CSC paid off the liens on the Gaster's
home.

Krantz offers nothing except his own self-serving

speculation that the transaction would have closed regardless of
the misrepresentation because allegedly it would be to CSC's and
the Gaster's detriment not to. (Brief at 30) While Krantz's
statement may be true, if the Division were to indulge it its own
speculation, we would point out that CSC could have been subject
to professional discipline on its contractor's license and
perhaps even criminal penalties if the liens were not discharged.
This may have provided an added inducement to Krantz and CSC to
pay off the liens.
The Division was justified in revoking Krantz's license
based on his misrepresentation at closing and his subsequent
misrepresentations after closing regardless of his fiduciary
obligation to the Gasters (which the Division vigorously
maintains he still owed).

As a licensed real estate broker,

Krantz owes a general duty to the public to act ethically and
competently.

Krantz's clear and substantial breach of that duty
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served as a sufficient basis for the Division to conclude that
Krantz violated sections 61-2-11(1) (misrepresentation), 61-2-11
(8)(being unworthy and incompetent) and 61-2-11(16)(breech of
fiduciary duty)3, and justified the revocation of Krantz's
license.
The Division requests that the court uphold the decision of
the Division of Real Estate revoking Krantz license to practice
real estate.
V. KRANTZ VIOLATED 61-2-20 BY USING A FORM NOT
APPROVED BY THE COMMISSION OR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL.
The ALJ found that Krantz used a real estate earnest money
agreement form that was not approved by the Division or the
Attorney General's Office. (R./270) Krantz contends that the
language of section 61-2-20 is permissive and not prohibitory and
does not apply to Krantz. (Brief at 33-34)

Krantz's argument is

warrants at most, a brief response.
The Division asserts that section 61-2-20 is designed to
allow real estate licensees to engage in practices that otherwise
would constitute the unauthorized practice of law.

Although

Krantz's violation of this statute is perhaps not as serious as
the other matters discussed above, the ALJ found sufficient
evidence to conclude that Krantz was acting as a real estate
3

. Apparently the ALJ mis-cited section 61-2-11(16). He cited
61-2-12(16)(1988) .
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licensee when he used forms, obtained from a friend (R./264), and
thus violated the letter and intent of section 61-2-20. (R./270)
Utah Code Ann. § (1988).
VI. THE ISSUANCE OF THE ORDER 9 MONTHS AFTER THE
HEARING DOES NOT WARRANT REVERSAL OF THE DIVISION'S
ORDER.
The recommended order issued by the Administrative was
issued on March 18, 1992 and was subsequently affirmed and
adopted by the Division Director and Real Estate Commission,
April 8, 1992 during the regularly scheduled month meeting of the
Commission.

May 29-30 1991. Consequently, the order was issue a

little less than 10 months after the hearing was concluded.
Krantz argues that the delay in receiving the order caused him
substantial prejudice because he "told his agents that the matter
was pending, and they chose to move their licenses with other
brokers." (Brief at 36)
It is not difficult to fathom what the agents listed under
Krantz would have done had the order been issued much sooner
revoking his broker's license.

Krantz has not suffered any

prejudice from the delay in receiving the order.

He maintained

his license during the pendency of the order and continues to
practice today under the stay order issued by this court.
Other than Krantz's self serving statements, he has offered
no proof that the delay caused him any harm to his professional
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career above and beyond the natural consequences that flow from a
disciplinary proceeding/

If anything the delay prevented the

Division from performing its statutory role of protecting the
public.
In addition, other than Krantz's bald assertion, he contends
that the delay may have tainted the ALJ's ability to make a
decision.

Without marshalling all of the evidence and providing

this court with a complete record, Krantzrs assertion is nothing
more than speculation.
VII. THE COMMISSION AND THE D^.-.SION DID NOT IMPOSE A
BROADER SANCTION ON KRANTZ.
Krantz contends that the decision of the Utah Real Estate
Commission and the Division Director adopting the recommended
order of the ALJ is vague because it imposes a broader sanction
than the recommended order issued by the ALJ. (Brief at 37)
Although the final order, signed by the Director and the
Commission, contains the term, "Real Estate Licensee" (R./278)
instead of the term "license to practice as real estate principal
broker", it does not expand the scope of the recommended order.
Krantz ignores the fact that he only has one license, the license
A

.
The hearing on this matter lasted two days and involved
the testimony of numerous witnesses and exhibits. The Department
of Commerce only employs one Administrative Law Judge to handle all
adjudicative proceedings involving professional licensing, real
estate and securities. Delays in the process are unfortunately a
fact of life.
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to practice as a principal broker.
The revocation of Krantz's principal brokers license
terminates the privilege of practicing in the profession of real
estate.

The order does not whittle down Krantz's license as a

principle broker to that of a licensed sales agent.

The

revocation of his license spells an end to his practice in the
profession until he applies and is issued a new license.

Simply

put, there is no issue before this court as there is no license
at issue other than Krantz's principle broker's license.
VIII. KRANTZ DID NOT HAVE A RIGHT TO RECONSIDERATION
UNDER UAPA.
Krantz asserts that section 63-46b-12(6)(c) "recognizes a
right to apply for reconsideration with the Administrative Law
Judge, with the Commission or with both."

Section 63~46b-

12(6)(c)(vii) requires agencies to provide parties with "a notice
of any right of further administrative reconsideration or
judicial review available to aggrieved parties; and (viii) the
time limits applicable to any appeal or review." Utah Code Ann. §
(1989) .
Krantz interpretation of the above quoted provisions is
misplaced.

Section 63-46b-13(l)(a) and not section 63-46b-12 is

determinative on the issue of the availability of agency review.
That section provides:
(l)(a) Within 20 days after the date that an order is
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issued for which review by the agency or by a superior
agency under Section 63-46b-12 is unavailable, and if
the order would otherwise constitute final agency
action, any party may file a written request for
reconsideration with the agency, stating the specific
grounds upon which relief is requested, (emphasis
added)
Utah Code Ann. § (1989).

Krantz was provided with a notice of

his right to agency review by the Department of Commerce which
serves as the superior agency to the Division of Real Estate.
Krantz also availed himself of the that right before bringing
this appeal. (R./345-352) Consequently, Krantz has not suffered
any prejudice due a lack of notice of his ri^Ivt to agency review
under UAPA.
IX. KRANTZ HAS NOT BEEN PREJUDICED BY THE DIVISION'S
PRIOR PRACTICE.
Krantz asserts that the Division deprive him of the
opportunity to contest whether the Division was acting "contrary
to the agency's prior practice" by not publishing the Division's
prior handling of disciplinary matters. (Brief at 38-39)

Krantz

also argues that "[t]he public that the licensing law seeks to
protect and licensees, too, have a right to learn from the
misadventures of brokers an agents who run amiss with the law
through complaints brought by the Division." (Brief at 39-40).
It is hard to imagine given Krantzfs imputed knowledge of
the Division's operations (and that of his counsel) how this
argument can be made in good faith.
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The Division has published a

quarterly news letters (Exhibit "B") for about 10 years.
Disciplinary matters are published as a matter of course in the
publication of "UTAH REAL ESTATE NEWS". (Exhibit "B") Moreover,
there are, and were in 1991, other avenues to gain access to past
disciplinary matters such as through discovery requests and
through a request of public documents from the Division.
X. THE DIVISION DOES NOT HAVE TO ESTABLISH
COMPREHENSIVE REGULATIONS THAT ADDRESS EVERY
CONCEIVABLE ISSUE.
Krantz argues that the Division's rules are not sufficiently
comprehensive to put licensed real estate agents on notice of
what is expected of them. (Brief at 40-44)

Krantz even goes so

far to say the ALJ failure to cite to rules in support of his
legal conclusions "should be sufficient grounds for this court to
investigate the adequacy of the Division's regulations."

(Brief

at 40). Finally, Krantz argues that the Division's failure to
provide comprehensive regulations denied his client due process.
It is uncertain whether Krantz is requesting a declaratory
order from the court or simply taking a shot gun approach on this
appeal.

These issues were never raised during the proceedings

below and were not raised in Krantz's docketing statement.

The

Division objects to these broad and unsupported arguments from
being raised on the first time on appeal.

Preservation of issues

applies to administrative proceedings as well as with regular
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trial courts. Brinkerhoff v. Schwendiman, 790 P.2d 587, 589
(1990).
As Krantz correctly pointed out, this court in In Re Topik
held that the statutory terms "unworthy and incompetent" found in
section 61-2-11 were not unconstitutionally vague or indefinite.
761 P.2d 32 (Utah App. 1988).

The court found that the terms

"unworthy and incompetent" were comparable to the statutory term
"unprofessional conduct" as used in the physicians licensing
laws.

Citing to Vance v. Fordham, 761 P.2d 124, the Topik court

agreed that the terms unworthy and incompetent provic. i
sufficient notice to the licensee for the following reasons:
(1) The subject of professional performance is too
comprehensive to be codified in detail. (2) Members of
a profession can properly be held to understand its
standards of performance. (3) Standards of performance
will be interpreted by members of the same profession
in the process of administrative adjudications.
Id.3
Krantz cannot excuse his own alleged lack of awareness of
the professional standards governing real estate agents, nor can
he speak for other licensed real estate professionals as he
attempts to do in his brief. (Brief at 43-44)

It is no defense

to Krantz's conduct underlying this action that real estate

5

. Let me apologize for the lack of a proper cite to the page
numbers. The only copy of the case available is the original copy
of the opinion.
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agents lack the sophistication of doctors or that the Division
fails to provide sufficient education for licensees. (Brief at
43-44).
Under the standards set forth in Vance and Topik, Krantz has
not established any violation of his rights to State and Federal
due process by virtue of the Commissions failure to enact
comprehensive regulations concerning professional conduct.

CONCLUSION
Krantz has raised numerous issues including numerous issues
challenging the factual findings of the administrative law judge.
However, it attempting to challenge the factual findings of the
administrative law judge, Krantz has failed to marshall the
evidence and provide the court with an adequate record from which
to review this case.

The Division requests that the court

presume that Division's factual findings are supported by
substantial evidence and that its application of its laws to the
facts is both rationale and reasonable.

The Division's order

revoking Krantz's license to practice real estate should be
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affirmed.

Moreover, Krantz's request for attorney fees should be

denied.
Submitted this

day of December, 1992

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
^ , certify that on
I served two copies of the foregoing
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Thomas F. Rogan, counsel for Petitioner in this matter, by
mailing it to him by first class mail with sufficient postage
prepaid to the following address:
THOMAS F. ROGAN
136 S. Main Street, #325
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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EXHIBIT "A"

BEFORE THE DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE

AUG211992/

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
STATE OF UTAH

In the Matter of the License
of Randy R. Krantz to Act as
Real Estate Principal Broker

Mary .\conan»
C l e * c? :^e Court
Utah Ccun CT Appals

CERTIFICATE THAT TRANSCRIPT
IS NOT REQUIRED
Case # RE87-11-19
Case # RE89-03-12
App. Ct. # 920487-CA

On this 21st day of August, 1992, the undersigned attorney,
Thomas F. Rogan, certifies on behalf of the respondent, Randy R.
Krantz, that no transcript will be requested in the above entitled case.
ThP undersigned certifies that on this day he has mailed by
first-class U.S. mail, postage prepaid, a copy of this Certificate to Blaine E. Twitchell, Director, Division of Real Estate,
and Shelley K. Wismer, Staff Legal Counsel, Division of Real
Estate, at P. 0. Box 45802, Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0802, and
to R. Paul Van Dam, Utah Attorney General, c/o Robert E. Steed,
Assistant Attorney General, 36 South State Street, Suite 1100,
Salt Lake City, UT 84111, and David W. Lund, Assistant Attorney
General, 236 State CapitoL Building, Salt Lake

Counsel's Address:
Counsel's Phone:

136 South Main Ste^St, Suite 325
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
801-355-0461

EXHIBIT "B

Utah Real Estate
A publication for Utah's real estate
professionals.

NEWS

fune, 1992

Volume 22 - Number 2

HANDLING FUNDS
FOR CLIENTS
As a real estate agent or broker,
jreat confidence is placed in you by
buyers as they entrust their earnest
noney funds to you. How well you
landle those funds is determined by
/our professionalism in knowing the
law, the Administrative Rules, the
Dffice policies and your compliance
with them.
The Division has received too
many complaints pertaining to the
improper handling of "other peoples"
money. Even one complaint from
this state's licensed professionals
may be considered "too many." For
example, agents have receipted for
money that the agent did not receive
or was to receive at some future date.
Agents have failed to turn in the
earnest money to the broker in a
timely manner or the broker has
failed to deposit the funds into the
Real Estate Trust Account within the
required time limit Some brokers,
primarily in property management
accounts, have failed to use the Trust
Account and have deposited only to
an operating account from which all
expenses, mortgage payments and
funds forwarded to the owner have
been paid. In many of these cases
the rental funds from one property
have been used to make the mortgage payments or expenses on
another. There has also been a rash
of Trust Account violations where
commissions were withdrawn from

had closed or money withdrawn and
used for personal use. In some cases
the broker was certain that the transaction would close, but ended up
being disappointed and short the
earnest money when it failed.
^ e law and the Administ -?five
Rules are explicit regarding the
handling of money held in trust for
others. If you do not know or are not
acquainted with them, you should
get a copy of the law and the rules
and become familiar with them.
You should also attend one of the
Real Estate Trust Account Seminars.
They are presented monthly at the
Heber M. Wells Building in Salt
Lake. The seminar has also been
presented recently in St. George,
Cedar City, Richfield and Roosevelt
Plans are being made to make presentations in other areas of the state
along with plans for increased trust
account auditing.
Remember, the real estate license
(and especially the brokers license)
was granted on the basis that the
licensee possessed the attributes of
"honesty, integrity, truthfulness,
reputation, and competency" as
stated in the law. These qualities
should always be kept foremost in
mind as you work with clients and
handle their funds. Do not lose vour
license from lack of knowledge or
the pressure of a weak

by Blaine Twitchell,
Division Director

moment when you need additional
money and decide that the trust
account is a good source. There will
always be a need or desire for more
money, but is the price you may pay
worth it? There are some licensees
that the Division and the Real Estate
Commission have had to take action
against whc *vill answer that question with aresoundingHiQ! Hopefully you will too.
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CORE COURSE - WHAT WE'VE LEARNED,
WHERE WE'RE GOING
by the Division of Real Estate

la* y Utah licensees have had the
pportunity to view the Core Course
ideo tape this last year. Each
censee has completed an evaluation
)im on the video tape, and those
valuations have been reviewed and
nalyzed by the Division staff.
is with most evaluations of any
ducation course, some have been
ositive and some negative. But the
Comments" sections have proved to
e invaluable in planning for the
392-93 Core Course.
ive Instructors vs. Video?
Tiefirstbig decision to make for the
uture was whether or not to use live
nstructors for the Core Course
nstead of providing the education on
'ideo tape. Many of the comments
ed us to believe that the video tape
vas frustrating for the viewers who
lad no-one of whom to ask a quesion. There were also abuses of the

video classes, in that some enlightened licensees brought lap-top
computers or video games to play
with, or books to read during the
presentation.
On the other hand, with a live
instructor the licensee would have to
wait until an instructor was available
or willing to come into the community with a class. Also, using a live
instructor would increase the cost of
the course by triple or quadruple,
depending on how far the instructor
would have to travel and depending
on the instructor fee.
As we struggled with the decision,
the local boards of Realtorsfromthe
smaller communities (who were
acting as course providers in their
areas) pleaded with us not to give up
on the video. We heard from the
licensees-board members and nonboard members-in the outlying

Trust Account Seminar
Registration
The Trust Account Seminar has had
jood reviews and attendance. The
seminar is currently being held every
nonth. Some classes have had as
nany as 47 and some as few as 17.
In order for a licensed person to
-egister for the seminar, please mail
/our $5.00 fee and a note indicating
he date you plan to attend, your full
lame, address, phone number and your
Jcense number. Unlicensed people
should mail the $5.00 fee with their
lame, address, phone number and
indicate that they are unlicensed.
There is norefundor transferring of

TT\

you are unable to attend after you have
paid the fee. You will need to submit
another$5.00 fee and information with
the date you plan to attend.
About a week before the seminar the
Division will mail a ticket with the
date, time, address and room number
of the seminar. If you have not received your ticket within a week before the seminar, give us a call to
confirm that you are registered.
A three hour continuing education
certificate will be given to licensees
who have attended therequired90%

areas who said the same thing. They
wanted the cost and theflexibilityof
the video!
Facing the distance some licensees
have to travel for education is a very
real issue to which the Division
needs to be sensitive. Also, if an
outlying area needs to wait until a
live instructor can come to town, the
licensees in that area lose considerableflexibilityas to when they can
get their education. And it doesn't
seem right that they should have to
pay more for their education than
someone living along the Wasatch
Front who has easy and relatively
inexpensive access to a variety of
classes.
A Better and More Complete
Workbook?
On the evaluations, there were many
complaints that the graphics in the
Continued on page 5

TRUST ACCOUNT
SEMINAR

Udgwt:
Account
Numb**
TranMcfon

1

The seminar will cover the
Administrative Rules for Trust Accounts
established under the Utah Real Estate
license law.

Location: Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah
530-6747

JulySV92 9:00-12:00 noon
August 7, '92 9:00-12:00 noon
September 11, '92 9:00-12:00 noon
3 hours CE credit
To register, please send $5.00 requesting
your preferred date to:
Division of Real Estate
PO Box 45806
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0806
You will be issued a ticket for admission.
If you park under the building, park in
METERED areas only or you will be
tirlri»t*H
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Disciplinary Sanctions
All Year Paradise, Inc., Developer of Powder
Ridge Village timeshares. Agreed to refrain
from the practices alleged in the Division's
Petition dated August 21,1991, or the developer's registration to sell timeshare interests in
Utah will be revoked. The Petition alleged that
the developer made payments on contracts which
had been rescinded by purchasers, failed to
forward contract payoffs to a lender, and rewrote delinquent purchase contracts in order to
inflate its line of credit which was based on the
amount of current, non-delinquent contracts.
#RE90-11-17.
Gubler, Steven L., Order issued May 30,1991
permanently enjoining him from selling, offering to sell, or making other disposition of interests in subdivided land in the Apple Valley
Subdivision in Washington County, Utah until
such time as he either registers those lands with
the Division or obtains an exemption from
registration. #RE90-ll-09.
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Krantz, Randy R., Principal Broker, Copper
State Realty. After a formal hearing, Krantz's
license was revoked based on making a substantial misrepresentation, making a false promise, violating the licensing chapter, being unworthy or incompetent to act as a licensee in
such manner to protect the public, and breaching a fiduciary duty owed to aprincipal. Krantz
promised that Copper State Construction, a
company in which he was also a principal,
would assume a loan on a condominium although he did not know whether the company
could do so. In a separate transaction in which
Copper State Construction built a new home
and took an existing home in trade, Krantz
failed to disclose to the purchasers of the new
home that subcontractors and materialmen had
not been paid, and failed to keep them informed
that payments were not made on their trade-in
home, causing the loan to go into default. Krantz
has requested agency review, which has stayed
the revocation pending the outcome on review.
#RE89-03-12.
Menaker, Gary, Wilderness Properties, LTD.,
and Mammoth View Ranch, Cease and Desist
Order issued Feb. 7,1992 prohibiting sales of
subdivided land in Garfield County, Utah until
such time as the land is properly registered with
the Division of Real Estate under the provisions
of the Utah Uniform Land Sales Practices Act
#RE92-02-01.
O'Brien, Gary, Principal Broker, OBPM, and
Certified Instructor at OBrien School of Real
Estate. After a formal hearing, O'Brien's real
estate license and real estate instructor certification were placed on probation until Nov. 12,
1992 based on conviction of a criminal offense
involving moral turpitude. OBrien was convicted of Attempted Forgery of a boat title.
#RE90-ll-23.

Reynolds, Douglas S., Principal Broker, Harbor Place Management. Consented to a revocation, with the revocation stayed and his license
placed on probation for five years on the condition that he reconstructs the brokerage records
he should have maintained for the years 1989 to
date accounting for all funds received as property manager during that time. The reconstructed records are to be submitted to a CPA
for verification. If the CPA's report shows
fraud or misappropriation of funds, the stay will
be lifted and the revocation imposed. Reynolds
routinely commingled client funds with his
own and deposited client funds into, and made
disbursementsfrom,an operating account. He
routinely made disbursements from pooled
funds on individual clients' expenses before
revenue had been collected on the specific
accounts of those clients. In some instances,
disbursement checks were refused due to insufficient funds. #RE89-11-01.
Tamarack Holdings, Inc., Cease and Desist
Order issued December 9, 1991 prohibiting
Tamarack Holdings, Inc.fromoffering or selling the Kona Reefshare in this state until such
time as it is properly registered with the Division under the provisions of the UtahTimeshare
and Camp Resort Act. #RE91-12-02.
Turner, Gilbert R., formerly principal broker
of Turner Company Real Estate. Consented to
a revocation of his broker's license and the
issuance of a sales agent license on probation in
its place, based on violation of U.C.A. Section
61-2-11(6), failing to account for or remit
monies, or commingling or diverting funds,
andU.C.A.$ection61-2-ll(10),failingtokeep
and make records available to the Division.
Turner withdrew a $5,000.00 earnest money
depositfromhis trust account and used it for his
own purposes. #RE91-06-14.

Prepensing Exam Results
Test Date
January 1992
February 1992
March 1992
April 1992
May 1992

Brokers
Taken Passed
21
15
33
22
28

10
7
18
7
14

Salesagents
Taken Passed
218
251
214
222
240

121
190
136
132
149
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BROKER
ALERT
The Division has
received areportabout
an out-of-state
company which has
been attempting to defraud real
estate brokers in our state. Typically, this company contacts a
broker by phone and claims to
represent bankers and lenders who
need an "exclusive broker" in the
local area to market foreclosures.
Usually the broker is asked to
send a check for $395.00 (or more)
to the company by overnight mail,
or sometimes the company will
arrange for the payment to be
picked up at the brokerage. The
broker is then furnished a list of
referrals. In the case which came
to our attention, thereferrallist was
bogus. The properties either were
not foreclosures, not for sale, or did
not exist
We do not mean to imply that all
out-of-state companies involved in
referral programs are suspect.
However, it is always good practice
when you are contacted by someone claiming to be an out-of-state
broker to contact the licensing
agency of the other state and
inquire about whether the broker is
in fact licensed and whether there
has been any disciplinary action
taken against the broker.
If you have been contacted by an
out-of-state company and have
been asked to pay money for
referrals, or if you have had any
problems similar to those outlined
in this article, please contact the
Division. We will forward any
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Emphasis on Agency Residential and Commercial
As licensees have been struggling
for the last five years with"Agency"
and "Agency Disclosure", it has
become more and more evident here
at the Division that the majority of
licensees-brokers and salesagents
alike-are still extremely confiised as
to what it all means.

Dual Agency (isn't this an oxymoron?) is the most misunderstood
form of agency. We see our licensees getting into trouble and into an
Undisclosed Dual Agency situation
because they don't understand at
what point the buyer crosses over the
line from being a customer into
being a client.
Our licensees are confused when
acting as a Buyer's Agent when they
think the signed agency disclosure
statement serves as a buyer agency
contract
Licensees acting as a Seller's
Agent (the listing agent) don't
understand the problems inherent
when offering sub-agency either
through the MLS or some other
cooperating broker situation.
And Disclosed Dual Agency is not
well understood when the licensee
doesn't understand the limitations on

It's no wonder everyone is confused! But help is near!
The focus for both pre-licensing
and post-licensing education is going
to emphasize AGENCY for the next
year. Each issue of the newsletter
will have an article on Agency in it.
The Core Course will be comprised
mostly of Agency and how to
practice Agency without killing the
deal.
The sales trainers in the larger
companies will be receiving some
specialized training so they can take
the message back to their companies.
And the pre-licensing and continuing
education instructors will receive the
same intensive training. If the
instructors/trainers are confused,
then their students surely will be
also.
The goal is to make certain that all
trainers and instructors are on the
same wave length, and that they are
all teaching the same material.
There will be many courses on
Agency offered throughout the state
this coming year.

If you are confused (and even if
you're not confused), this will be the
year to get some good courses on
Agency. Don't let yourself get
caught in an ugly lawsuit because
vnnriirliVtunderstand what was
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CORE COURSE - WHAT
WE'VE LEARNED,
WHERE WE'RE GOING
'ontinuedfrom page 2

ideo were not left on the screen
ong enough for someone to copy the
nformation down. If the same
visual was not in the workbook, then
t was lost
licensees also felt that the workbook
vas not complete enough and didn't
eave them with enough information
o use later on.
n the future we will make certain
hat every visual in the video will
low also be duplicated in the workwok. The instructor's outline will
ilso be provided so that the licensee
.vill end up with some beneficial
^ference material.
Why Not Make It a Professional
Production?
Many viewers thought we had set up
a home video camera to make the
Core Course video. Nothing could
be further from the truth.
In the quest for afirst-rateproduction, the facilities and expertise of
the Instructional Media Department
at the University of Utah were used.
It was definitely not a home production.

However, some important lessons
were learned about the graphics and
the timing of the graphics. We hope
to make those transitions smoother
in the future.
A Live Class?
Even though there was an audience
during the presentation, it was so
small there was no interaction
between the students and teachers.
That problem will be remedied for
the next production by making
certain there is a full, interactive
class. Hopefully this class will ask
most of the same questions that
another class would ask, and this
will help satisfy some of the frustration of the video-viewers who are
not able to ask questions.
Better a^^ Better
As much as we all like to think we
have all the answers, there's nothing
quite like having mistakes and faults
pointed out to you.
Many thanks to all of you who took
the time to give constructive criticism. Hopefully most of those ideas
will be able to be incorporated into
the next video.
We rely on the viewers of the video
to tell us what works and what
doesn't. By turning "mistakes" into
"learning experiences", we can only
be better and better.
• •• ••m

!*•

In Memoriam
The Division of Real Estate would like to express condolences to the families of the following real estate licensees
who have recently passed away:
\
^

Betty N. Atkinson

W Jordan

Jack W. Bowen

St George

V Joann B. DeHaast

Provo

D. Blayne Morrill

Whiterocks

Karla K. Rawlings

Lewiston

ErcellL.Sell

Bountiful
*
Jr
Salt Lake %*

F. T. Wetzel
. t

What Classes Can I
Take for Continuing
Education?
Course work taken to satisfy the
continuing education requirementmust
have been previously certified for that
purpose. The certified courses must
also serve to meet the education requirement of protection of the public.
What about courses taken out ofstate?
The law does allow a licensee to get
credit for a course which has been
taken out of state. The course needs to
have been already certified in the other
state for continuing education, and the
subject matter needs to deal with the
issue of protection of the public.
An application form is available at
the Division for those persons wishing
to apply for credit for out of state
courses. There is a fee of $35.00 for
each course review, and the licensee
needs to allow a minimum of 60 days
after the application is received at the
Division offices for it to be reviewed
and approved.
What about college courses?
There are some college courses that
have already been approved for continuing education, but just because it is
a college course doesn't mean that it
will have automatic continuing education approval.
What about retaking a pre-licensing
class for continuing education?
Here again, if the pre-licensing class
has had prior approval to serve as both
pre-licensing and continuing education, credit can be had for that kind of
a class. But there must be prior ap-

The National Association of
Real Estate License Law Officials
THE 1992 "DIGEST OF REAL ESTATE
LAWS" is a reference guide of license law
statistics. Designed for real estate executive officers, educators, attorneys and
those in need of state-by-state statistics
on license law requirements. Information
contained in the "DIGEST" has been used
extensively in testifying and lobbying before legislative bodies throughout the
United States and Canada. This guide is
up-dated annually and the statistics contained change considerably from year to
year. Sign up today for the Digest.

SEND TODAY FOR "THE DIGEST OF REAL ESTATE LICENSE LAWS'
PHONE NUMBER (

NAME.
FIRM NAME.

).
DATE.

ADDRESSCITY

STATE.

ZIP.

D I have enclosed $30 00 payment for the "DIGEST OF REAL ESTATE LICENSE LAWS".
Bill my D VISA D Master Card #

Expiration

D Put me on the subscription list for "The 1993 Digest of Real Estate License Laws."
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CORE COURSE SCHEDULE
gham City/Tremonton Board of Realtors
Pre-Registration
Zolleen Reeve

723-5590

rbon/Emery Board of Realtors - Price
Pre-Registratlon
Leanna Axelgard
w Mary Bishop

637-7500
637-6559

ntral Utah Board of Realtors - Richfield
Pre-Regist ration
Julie Curtis

896-8261

Salt Lake City
2nd & 4th Thursdays 6:30-9:30 Finance 22
"Core Course"
at BOTH locations: Cedar Park/U of U
5286 S. 320 W..SLC
and Bountiful U of U
Stoker School
75 E. 200 S., Bountiful

Location:

9:00-12:00 "Core Course"
1:00-4:00 "Risk Reduction"
Ogden Bd. of Realtors Office
2748 Adams Ave., Ogden

Pre-Regist ration
Kassi

399-9273

an County Board of Realtors - Cedar City
Location:

TBA

Pre-Registration
Steve Cony

Salt Lake City
Location: Salt Lake Community College
South Campus
1575 S. State
Salt Lake City

943-9608

Wasatch County Board of Realtors
Heber City
Pre-Registration
Lauren Williams

Salt Lake City
Spencer Real Estate Education
Location: 4476 South 450 West, #B
Salt Lake
Pre-Registration

Location: Washington Co. Bd. Office
90 E. 100 S., Ste 101, St. George
Pre-Registration
Christy Hadey

268-3355

Salt Lake City
Stringham Real Estate School
Location: 5258 Pinemont Dr, B-160
.Salt Lake

Pre-Registration
Jim Curtis

268-2148

753-1044
Tooele Board of Realtors

259-6493

ark City Board of Realtors

Pre-Registration
Bill Allsop

882-5590

Uintah Basin Board of Realtors - Vernal

Pre-Registration

Pre-Registration
*iiQ-4119

ftcrri Shnckev

789-2390

628-7374

Please contact the Board/Area
person directly at the phone number that
has been provided. You cannot pre-register with the Division.

269-8889

Salt Lake City
C-21 of the Rocky Mountains
June 15
5:00-8:00
"Core Course"
July 27
5:00-8:00
"Core Course"
Aug 17
5:00 - 8:00
"Core Course"
Location: 4001 South 700 East, #21
Salt Lake

654-2250

Washington County Board of Realtors
S t George
July 16 9:00 -12:00
"Risk Reduction"

CONTINUING
EDUCATION

586-2525

ioab
Pre-Registration
Doug McElhenny

Pre-Registration
Gary Pickering

Pre-Registration

ogan Board of Realtors
October 22 9:00-12:00 "Core Course"
AND
1:00-4:30 "Core Course"
Location: Logan City Offices
255 N. Main - Conference Room
Logan
Pre-Registration
Cara Brewer

Pre-Registration (Limited Seating)
Deborah
226-3777

Pre-Registration
U of U Correspondence Study 581-6472

eater Ogden Area Association of Realtors
August 19

Utah County Board of Realtors - Provo/Orem
3rd Friday of Each Month
1:004:00 "Risk Reduction"
4th Friday of Each Month
1:00-400 "Core Course"
Location: Utah Co. Bd. of Realtors Office
901 S. Orem Blvd., Orem

UPDATE
JUNE 1992
(Continued on page 8)
f
Shepherd School of Real Estate
2780 Madison Ave
Ogden, UT 84403
Bill and Jean Shepherd
801-393-1422
or Gary Pickering
801-943-9608
#91-05-02 Core Course
3hrs
Every Saturday afternoon
#92-01-04 Real Estate Finance
1 st S aturday each month
3 hrs
#92-01-05 Earnest Money Sales Agreement
2nd Saturday each month
3 hrs
#92-01-06 Agency Disclosure
3rd Saturday each month
3 hrs
#92-05-06 Appraisal-Cost Replacement
A,V
M »M
3 hrs

8

Utah Real Estate News
REAL ESTATE

Salt Lake Community College
/Salt"]
South Campus
1575 S. State
Salt Lake City, UT 84115
Gary Pickering
801-943-9608

CONTINUING
EDUCATION
CERTIFIED PROVIDERS

#92-01-04 Real Estate Finance
2nd Thursday each month
3 hrs
#92-01-05 Earnest Money Sales Agreement]
3rd Thursday each month
3 hrs
#92-01-06 Agency Disclosure
4th Thursday each month
3 hrs
#92-05-06 Appraisal-Cost
^ Replacement Method
3 hrs v
/Salt Lake Board of Realtors
2970 East 3300 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84109
Shelley Reed
801-486-4465

'Stringham Real Estate School
5258 S. Pinemont Dr., Suite B-160
Salt Lake City, UT 84123
Arnold or Martell Stringham
801-269-8889

HP Calculator
Contracts I
Contracts II
Agency I
Agency H
Listings & Options
Finance I
Finance II
Finance III
Finance IV
Mortgage Law
Appraisal I
Appraisal II
Appraisal HI
Earnest Money I
Earnest Money II
Utah Law I
Utah Lawn
Utah Law m
Utah Law IV
Utah Law V
Financial Controls
Taxation

Division of Real Estate
PO Box 45806
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0806
801-530-6747

3 hrs
2 hrs
2 hrs
2 hrs
2 hrs
2 hrs
2 hrs
2 hrs
2 hrs
2 hrs
2 hrs
2 hrs
2 hrs
2 hrs
2 hrs
2 hrs
2 hrs
2hrs
2 hrs
2 hrs
2 hrs
1 hr
lhr

Residential Sales Council
430 North Michigan Ave.
Chicago, IL 60611-4092
Lois Zurella
312-321-4441
#92-02-14 RS 205-Financial Skills for
the Residential Specialist
16 hrs
#92-06-01 Making Money Selling &

#92-04-07 Power Prospecting &
I
y Presentations
2.5hrsy

#91 -10-05 Conventional & Government
V Financing Programs
6 hrs J
*

Spencer Real Estate School
4476 S. 450 W.,SuB
Murray, UT 84123
Lorenzo Spencer
801-268-3355

Utah Law I
Utah LawII
Utah Law m
Utah Law IV
Earnest Money I
Earnest Money II
Agency

2hrs
2hrs
2hrs
2hrs
2hrs
2hrs
2hrs

/Sky View Publications Inc.
136 S. Main, Suite 325
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Tom Rogan
801-355-0462

)
~\

#92-04-05 RE Case Law
lhr
#92-04-06 RE Case Law
lhr
#91-08-02 "What You Don't Know May
Hurt You - Recent Utah Cases Dealing
with Commercial Real Estate" 3 hrs
#91-10-04 Building a Foundation for
Risk Reduction: Avoiding Fraud,
Misrepresentation & the Unauthorized
s^ Practice of Law
3hrs ^
Roger T. Beattie, Inhouse Training
3039 S. 600 W.
Bountiful, UT 84010
Roger Beattie
801-298-7111
#91-12-05 Real Estate Investment
Analysis
8 hrs
#91 -12-06 Property M anagement
4 llTS

/National Association of Realtors
777 -14th Street NW
Washington, D.C. 20005-3271
Robert Hammond
Convention Education Coordinator
#92-NAR-01 Fair Housing in the 90's Rental
3 hrs
#92-NAR-02 Financing the Home
Purchase
3 hrs
#92-NAR-03 Expand Your Market:
International Real Estate
3 hrs
#92-NAR-04 Todays Tools for
Commercial Leasing
3 hrs
#92-NAR-05 Outlook for Risk
3 hrs
v Reduction

#91-12-04 Utah Law I, n , m , IV 8 hrs

FiinHflm*»ntfllc

3 hrs

/Randal K. Eagar
5200 Highland Dr.
Salt Lake City, UT 84117
801-272-9686

/The Hunt School
257 North Donlee Drive
St. George, UT 84770
Bonnie Hunt May
801-673-9721

#92-01-06
#92-01-07
#92-01-08
#92-01-09
#92-03-04
#92-03-05
\#92-03-06

Residential Finance

#91-07-02 "Lending Fundamentals-How
V to Get the Bank to Say Yes" 3 hrs J

S

The following courses are on video tape
with a test/workbook required. The dates
and times are flexible.

#92-01-19
VUp-Date

/Department of Business - SUU
351 West Center St.
Cedar City, UT 84720
Alan Hamlin
801-586-5417

#92-04-04 Trust Account Seminar
July 10
3 hrs
August 7
3 hrs

#92-04-08 Earnest Money Sales
Agreement
1.5 hrs
#91-07-04 Real Estate Finance
3 hrs
#92-02-11 Fair Housing & Equal
Opportunity
3 hrs
^#92-02-12 Realtors Code of Ethics 3 hrsj

#91-10-02
#92-03-08
#92-03-09
#92-03-10
#92-03-11
#92-03-12
#92-03-13
#92-03-14
#92-03-15
#92-03-16
#92-03-17
#92-03-18
#92-03-19
#92-03-20
#92-03-21
#92-03-22
#92-03-23
#92-03-24
#92-03-25
#92-03-26
#92-03-27
#92-03-28
#92-03-29

JUNE 1992
Please contact the providers for their
individual schedules of courses.

/Success Siminars
7832 N. LaCanada Dr
Tucson, AZ 85704

"Gerald Crawford
819Woodmoor
Bountiful, UT 84010
801-534-1911
^#91-10-06 Cover Your Agency 4 hrs
/Attorney's Title Guaranty Fund
645 S. 200 E., Ste 102
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Stephanie Harper
801-328-8229
#91-12-01 Professional Liability & Real
V^ Estate Transactions
4hrs J
/Mountain Fuel Supply Co.
180 E. 100 S.
PO Box 11368
Salt Lake City, UT 84147
Stephen Denison
801-534-5588
#91-12-02 Marketing Energy Efficient
V^ Homes
3hrs J
/National Business Institute, Inc.
PO Box 3067
Eau Claire, WI54702
Jamie Larscheid
715-835-8525
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Commercial Investment
Real Estate Institute
430 North Michigan
Chicago, IL 60611
Aida Wahmann
312-321-4460
#92-01-11 CI 101: Financial Analysis for
Commercial Real Estate
32 hrs
#92-01-12 Q 201: Market Analysis for
Commercial Real Estate
32 hrs
#92-01-13 Q 301: Decision
32 hrs
Analysis
#92-01-14 Q 401: Intro to
Commercial RE Analysis
32 hrs
#92-01-15 Q 402: Intro to
27 hrs
Commercial Brokerage
#92-01-16 Q 404: Advanced Tax
Planning for Commercial RE 27 hrs
#92-01-17 CI 405: Selling
Commercial RE
12 hrs
#92-01-18 CI 406: Negotiating
Workshop for Commercial
Real Estate
12 hrs
#92-01 -21 CI 407: Advanced Techniques
in Marketing Commercial RE 27 hrs
N

f
Utah Association of Realtors
5710 South Green Street
Salt Lake City, f r f °4123
Dee McRae
801-268-4747
#92-02-07 GRI 200
16hrs
#91-10-01 GRI 300
16hrs
#91-08-01 GRI 400
16 hrs
#92-02-05 GRI 500
3hrs
#92-02-06 GRI 600
16hrs
#91-05-05 Environmental Hazards
Seminar
3 hrs
#91-07-01 Application of the HP
Calculator.
Basic
2hrs
Intermediate
4hrs
Advanced
4hrs
#92-05-03 Get the Listing - Priced
Right
3hrs
#92-05-04 Seven Deadly Sins of
Qualifying Buyers
3hrs
Real Estate Specialists
201 East St. George Blvd.
St. George, UT 84770
Jim Coleman
801-628-1606
#92-02-08 Listing & Earnest Money
Sales Agreements - The Path to
Your Bank
3 hrs
#92-02-09 Agency, Ethics &
, RE Roulette
6 hrs
Lefavi Financial Center
1245 E. Brickyard Rd, Ste 550
Salt Lake City, UT 84106
Bruce Lefavi
801-486-9000
#92-02-03 Tax Strategies for the
Real Estate Owner
6 hrs
#92-02-04 Charitable Remainder
IltiitTmst
3 hrs

Georgia Ball
675 East 2100 South, #370
Salt Lake City, UT 84106
801-467-6688

Smith & Froerer
298 24th St, Ste 200
Ogden, UT 84401
Ramona Sessions
801-627-1870
#92-01-20 Avoiding Real Estate
V Licensee liability
4 hrs

Utah Taxpayers Association
1578 West 1700 South, #105
Salt Lake City UT 84104
Howard Stephenson
801-972-8814

Consolidated Realty Group
175 East 400 South, Ste. 710
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Jim Whitehead
801-322-2000
#92-02-01 RE Negotiating

#92-03-31 Learning How to use the
\ ^ Dispute Resolution System
2.5 \x%J

7 hrs

Park City Board of Realtors
1881 Prospector Ave.
Park City, UT 84060
Nancy Seraphin
801-649-7171
^#92-03-01 Building Technology 6 hrs
Women's Council of Realtors
430 North Michigan Ave.
Chicago, IL 60611
Kim Shambrook
312-329-8569 or 312-329-8482
#92-03-02 Referral & Relocation
Certification Course 101
3 hrs
#92-03-03 Referral & Relocation
Certification Course 102
3 hrs
v
Huntingdon, Chen-Northern, Inc. Division
350 West 2700 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84115
Fred Snyder
801-487-3661
#92-03-07
Hazardous Waste, EnvironVmental Liability & RE Transactions 3 hrs J
Utah CCIM Chapter
5710 South Green Street
Murray, UT 84123
George Richards
801-278-4416
#92-03-30 HP-19IIB Use in RE
V Investment Analysis
3 hrs
U of U Correspondence Study
2180 Annex
Salt Lake City, UT 84112
Sheila Steiner
801-581-6472
V#92-02-10 Utah RE License Law 12 hrs
f National Business Institute, Inc.
PO Box 3057
Eau Claire, WI54702
Becky Nelson
715-835-8525
#92-02-13 Advanced RE Law in UT

#92-04-01 The Changing of the
VGuard
4hrs
James Lemmon
233 West 1300 South
Hurricane, UT 84737
801-635-4636

V#92^04-02 HP-12C Intermediate 3 hrs
Utah Valley Community College
800 West 1200 South
Orem, UT 84058
AldenTueller
801-374-9924
#92-04-03 Tax-exempt Tru* i ales 1 hr
Institute of Real Estate Management
5282 South 320 West, Ste D-100
Murray, UT 84115
Richard Forsythe
801-262-1706
#92-05-01 Solving Real Estate Math
Problems Using the HP 19BII 3 hrs
#92-05-02 Writing a Management
Plan
3 hrs
v
NAIOP
The Assoc for Commercial Real Estate
1215 Jefferson Davis Hwy, Ste 100
Arlington, VA 22202-4302
Bonnie Gopler
703-979-3400
#92-05-05 Structuring Build-to-Suit
V Deals
Ibis

J

/Homeowners Marketing Services ofUtarA
2290 East 4500 South, Ste 170
Salt Lake City, UT 84117
Curtis W. Hodgson
801-277-3226
#92-05-07 HMS Prove It

7 hrs

David Johnson
PO Box 3598
Park City, UT 84060
801-649-5602
#92-01-03 RE Agency Law
3 hrs
#92-02-02 RE Law Legal Clinic 4 hrs
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KNOW
YOUR
LISTING
from the
Colorado Real Estate News

The Commission has noted
an increase in the number of
complaints containing allegations of misrepresentations of
listed properties. The investigations, several of which have
resulted in disciplinary action,
revealed a lack of thoroughness in researching the properties.
Listing agents, as well as employing brokers, are reminded
of the importance of dispensing
accurate, confirmed information. Every office should
maintain a check sheet to be
used in verifying information;
it should identify the proper
source of the information.
It is important that if a property isre-listed,updated information be obtained. The copying of information from an old
brochure or MLS insertion has
proven to be the undoing of
several agents. This is usually
manifested in cases where
square footages are copied as
opposed to actual measurements being taken by the listing agent. Also, changes in
zoning have often caused problems for agents.
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Electronic
Testing
Available
The last paper-and-pencil prepensing test will be administered July
18,1992. Electronic testing will
begin in August in Salt Lake City.

It will be offered each Saturday
with the exception of national
holiday weekends. There will be
two testing sessions per day, and a
maximum of 33 candidates can be
tested during each session.
The lap-top testing device looks
like an "Etch-a Sketch" toy. The
questions will appear on the screen
and the candidate can answer the
questions by simply touching the
screen. Absolutely no computer
knowledge is necessary!
Candidates will call an "800"
number to Assessment Systems, Inc.
(ASI) to make areservationno less
than three days before their desired
Saturday test date. Cancellations of
a reservation must be made at least
four business days prior to the
requested test date or the candidate
will be charged.
Candidates may use a calculator
that is silent, hand-held, batteryoperated without paper tape printing
capabilities and without an alphabetic keypad.
The best news of all minutes
after completing the examination,
the applicant will be given the test
results!

AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITY
ACT AND
PROPERTY
MANAGEMENT
Much has been written about
the Americans with Disability
Act (ADA) since its enactment
and since the January 26,1992
deadline for compliance with the
Justice Department regulations.
Real Estate managers need to be
concerned with who is responsible for altering properties to
conform with the Act. Is the
ownerresponsiblefor widening
the corridors within a commercial
tenants space? Should the office
tenant pay the increased common
area charges due to the installation of lower, more accessible
elevator panels?
These are just some of the issues
real estate managers should
address about the ADA during
new lease negotiations and lease
renewals.
See the accompanying article on
the Americans with Disability
Act on page 11. For more
detailed information on your
specific situation, please contact
an attorney who is acquainted
with the Act.

It's hard to stand still in life. If
you are not going forward, you
may be going backward. Sometimes this movement is so subtle
we're not aware of it.

June 1992

[Americans With Disability Act Of 1990 (" ADA")
On January 26,1992 the Americans with Disability Act of 1990
became effective. For the first
time ever, most private enterprises are now required to afI firmatively accommodate persons
1 with disabilities, rather than
I merely abstain from discriminat11 ing against them in the areas of
J access to public places and
1 employment rights. In other
1 words, mere equal treatment is
I not enough. Places of public
1 accommodation, public services
1 and transportation must eliminate
barriers to access by persons with
disabilities.
A disability is defined as a
physical or mental impairment

fk

fk

that would substantially limit or
impede one of life's major activities.
A "major life activity1' would
include: caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing,
hearing, breathing, learning, or
working.

otherwise qualified to do the job.
The ADA also requires employers
to make reasonable accommodations to allow otherwise qualified
persons with disabilities to do the
job, unless such accommodation
constitutes an undue hardship.

An impairment would include
contagious and non-contagious
diseases and conditions. A disability
under this act also includes having a
history, a record of impairment or
being regarded as impaired.

The penalties for violation of this
act are very severe. If you think
you need more complete information, please contact:

Employers must prohibit discrimination in employment practices (e.g.,
application, hiring, firug, advancement and compensation) against
persons with disabilities who are

fk

fk

Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission
1801 L Street NW
Washington, DC 20507
800-669-EEOC (voice)
800-800-3302 (TDD)

fk

fk fk

AGENT LIABLE
FOR COMPETING WITH CUSTOMER
You have probably been
warned about the dangers of "selfdealing"~buying property for
yourself without telling your
seller. But what happens if you
buy property for yourself without
telling a prospective buyer?
Tifft, an Idaho real estate broker,
received an offer on a listing and
passed it on to the seller. While
the seller considered the offer,
Tifft decided he wanted to buy the

property for himself. He contacted
the seller and made an offer on the
property, with better terms than the
original offer.
The seller accepted Tifft's offer.
When the prospective buyer found
out what happened, he sued the
broker for breach of his duty to the
public.
The court agreed with the buyer.
Real estate agents have the duty to

deal honestly and fairly with the
general public, and cannot take
advantage of prospective buyers.
While many previous cases have
held that the agent's primary duty
is to find the best terms for the
seller, all parties to the transaction
must be treated fairly. The prospective purchaser was allowed to
buy the property from the agent.
This article reprinted with permission from
the March 1989 issue of "Real Estate
Selling Strategies," a publication of the
National Real Estate Institute
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Parting Shot
by William Coleman
Cycles. We observe them and we
live them. Yet another occurs in
June as my five year term on the
Real Estate Commission concludes.
In June, 19871 came to the Commission as we were finishing up the new
Earnest Money Sales Agreement
form. Interestingly, I exit doing the
same thing. We are nearing completion of the totally revised form, now
known as the Real Estate Purchase
Contract. Five years is a long time
to not change our most critical form
in an industry that is changl *z "s fast
as ours is. I am pleased that we have
againrespondedto those many
changes.

Department of Commerce
Division of Real Estate
P.O. Box 45806
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0806
Distribution: Kindly Circulate and Post

In the past five years the Commission has completelyrewrittenall the
rules andregulationsfor licensees,
and ushered in continuing education.
This, on top of the ordinary business
of reviewing licensing standards,
conducting hearings, and working
under three separate Division
Directors.
The most gratifying part of this
position has been working with the
licensees and the staff at the Division. My respect for the work being
done by the thousands of exceptional
Utah real estate professionals is
heightened by my experience with
problems of the few.

My respect for the incredible work
load and the devotion of the staff at
the Division has been most enlightening. These are people working
very hard and shorthanded for all of
our benefits.
As this cycle ends and another
begins, I will look back on these past
five years with pride and enlightenment, wishing every other licensee
could have the same experience.
Thank you for the opportunity to
serve you.

Bill Coleman

Bulk Rate
U.S. Postage
PAID
S.L.C., Utah
Permit No. 4327

Utah Real Estate
A publication for Utah's real estate
professionals.
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AGENCY
DISCLOSURE
by Blaine Twitchell,
Division Director
Utah has had an
"Agency Disclosure" requirement
for several years.
Reports and complaints reaching the
Division indicate there is still a lack of
understanding on the part of the licensee as to what isrequiredby this Administrative Rule.
Administrate Rule R174-6-14,
Agency Disclosure, states in part "In
everyrealestate transaction involving
a licensee, as agent or principal, the
licensee must clearly disclose in writing to the buyer and seller, lessor and
lessee, his agencyrelationship(s).The
disclosure must be made prior to the
buyer and seller, lessor and lessee
entering into a binding agreement with
each other and become part of the
permanent file. When a binding agreement is signed, the prior agency disclosure must be confirmed in a separate provision incorporated in or attached to that agreement,..." The confirmation is accomplished by completing paragraph 10 of the Earnest Money
Sales Agreement.
Frequently we find that the agent
does not make early disclosure and
relies on the confirmation in the Earnest Money Sales Agreement to be the
disclosure. This is too late. The damage
has been done. By this time the buyer
is convinced, with all of the agent's
attention, the agent isrepresentingthe
buyer, and the buyer has subsequently
divulged confidential information to
the agent In the agent's fiduciary

ACTIVE BROKERS!!
NO CONTINUING EDUCATION??

NO LICENSE!!
Question: 1. What's an easy way for me to lose my license?
2. What's an easy way to put my company out of business?
3. What's an easy way to lose my sales agents?

Answer: Do not complete Continuing Education on time.
Active Brokers: If you do not complete Continuing Education (CE) requirements on time, the Division of
Real Estate cannot renew your license
in a timely manner and your license
will expire.
That means you will be unable to
transact any real estate business until
you have completed the CE requirement and a new license is issued to
you.
The salesagents affiliated with you
will be placed on inactive status, and
they will be unable to transact any real
estate business for you until you are relicensed.
In essence, you will be out of
business!
If your salesagents do not complete
CErequirements,themselves, the

Division cannot issue active licenses
to them. That means they will be
unable to transact anyrealestate business until they have completed the CE
requirements and are issued new licenses.
You must make certain that you and
your salesagents know the who, what,
when, where, why, and how of Continuing Education. The answers to
frequently asked questions are on page
2 of this issue of the Utah Real Estate
News. Post it in your office so everyone can see it. If you do not understand
something, please contact us and we
will be happy to explain.
Make certain you consistently read
future issues of the Real Estate News
for more information about Continuing Education and how it affects you.

capacity as the agent or subagent for
the seller, he/she is obligated to pass
on that information to the seller. The
buyer may subsequently think his/her
situation has been compromised and
take legal action.
Both the seller and the buyer should
understand the licensee's agency position. The agent should notify the buyer
at the initial contact. It should be made
official with the written disclosure
statement signed by the buyer as soon

as possible, especially before the agent
begins to provide specific assistance.
The buyer's signature on the disclosure statement acknowledges that he/
she understands the agency role. This
relationship is later confirmed in the
Earnest Money Sales Agreement, In
the agency function it is advisable for
the licensee to follow this pattern, thus
reducing the buyer's chances of misunderstanding, confusion and potential litigation.
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Disciplinary Sanctions
Baldwin, Jay B„ Associate Broker, Wardley
Better Homes and Gardens. After a formal
hearing, Baldwin was found to have made a
negligent misrepresentation concerning the
condition of a roof by representing to a purchaser that the roof on a home was "new", when
in fact it was in need of repair. When Baldwin
listed the home, which belonged to his grandparents and had been built in 1954, his grandmother stated that the home had a new roof but
she did not indicate when the roof had been
replaced. Baldwin maintained that his use of
the word "new" meant "replaced" and "not
original". Baldwin was fined $250 and his
license was placed on probation for two years.
#RE91-01-04.
Hansen, Steven D., Principal Broker, Steven
D. Hansen & Associates Real Estate. Consented to revocation of his broker's license
effective October 26, 1991 based on "being
unworthy or incompetent to act as a principal
broker...in such manner as to safeguard the
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interests of the public" and failing to account for
or to remit funds or commingling or diverting
funds. Hansen purchased a home on contract
and agreed to assume the loan. He resold the
home on contract and did not keep the loan
payments current although he received payments from the contract purchasers. Hansen
will be eligible to receive a sales agent's license
after his broker's license has been revoked for
one year. #RE90-09-03.
Hutchinson, James H., Sales Agent, Kennelly
and Associates. After a formal hearing, Hutchinson was found to have been convicted of a
criminal offense involving moral turpitude,
making a corrupt offer to abank official. Hutchinson was not acting as a licensee in the transaction. His license will be placed on probation
for the duration of his criminal probation subject to compliance with the terms of his criminal
probation, participation in alcohol therapy, and
meetings every six months with the Utah Real
Estate Commission. #RE91-03-04.

Kowalsky, Greg, and L'Empire
Suisse, Park City, Utah. Cease and Desist
Order issued December 20, 1991 prohibiting
offering, selling or engaging in further solicitation intended to result in the sale of timeshare
interests until such time as the timeshares are
registered with the Division. #RE91-12-12.
Morse, Bruce Allen, Sales Agent, Plaza Properties. License revoked by default effective
February 10, 1992 based on conviction of a
criminal offense involving moral turpitude and
making a substantial misrepresentation to the
Division. When Morse applied for a license in
1989, he failed to disclose the conviction on his
application. #RE91-08-01.
Affordable Luxury Lodging and Jeff Dunn,
Cease and Desist Order issued December 4,
1991 prohibiting unlicensed property management Subsequent to the issuance of the Cease
and Desist Order, principal broker Michael
Larsen licensed Affordable Luxury Lodging as
a property management company under his
supervision. #RE91-11-11.

Fair Housing Update
$60,000 Settlement
in Service Dog Case

In Memoriam

The manager and owner of a California apartment complex have agreed to
settle charges that they discriminated
against a handicapped tenant who used
a wheel-chair and a trained service
dog. In the case of HUD vs. Puckett,
No. 09-89-1495-1,7-31-90, an administrative charge of discrimination was
filed on behalf of Delores Roberts, a
resident, against the manager and
owner of Quail Creek Apartments ir
Escondido, California. Roberts ii
unable to use her left arm and left lej
and must rely upon a wheelchair an
trained service dog.

The Division of Real Estate would
like to express condolences to the
families of the following real estate
licensees who have recently passed
away:
Franklin G. Adams

Salt Lake

Joann B. Dehaas

Provo

Gerald W. Obert

Park City

Karen D. Peters

Layton

Vadal W. Peterson

Salt Lake

Ray S. Tucker

Provo

Continued on page.

Prelicensing Exam Results
Test Date
September 1991
October 1991
November 1991
December 1991

Brokers
Taken Passed
14
12
26
24

4
5
11
12

Salesagents
Taken Passed
217
158
140
129

111
90
70
67

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER

BEFORE THE DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

In the Matter of the License of
Randy R. Krantz to Act as a
Real Estate Principal Broker

:
:
:
:

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW AND RECOMMENDED ORDER
Case No. RE87-11-19
Case No. RE89-03-12

Appearances:
David W. Lund for the Division of Real Estate
Nicholas E. Hales and Brenda G. Eichers for Respondent
By the Administrative Law Judge:
The instant adjudicative proceeding was initiated pursuant to the issuance of an August
21, 1989 Notice of Agency Action. The notice was sent by certified mail and received by a
Rachael Krantz on August 22, 1989. As set forth in the notice, Respondent was required to
file a written response with thirty (30) days from the date of the notice.
Respondent did not timely file the written response. By motion, dated November 27,
1989, the Division sought entry of Respondent's default. Respondent appeared for a
December 12, 1989 hearing on the pending motion before J. Steven Eklund, Administrative
Law Judge for the Department of Commerce. Given Respondent's appearance and his
assurance a written response would be filed within a reasonable time, the Court took the
motion under advisement and Respondent was ordered to file a response no later than January
11, 1990. He was also afforded the opportunity to obtain to legal counsel for purposes of this
proceeding.
On January 11, 1990, Respondent filed a response in both this proceeding and another
case which had been initiated (RE89-03-12). Pursuant to a July 31, 1990 notice, both cases
were scheduled to be heard on August 28, 1990. However, Respondent filed a motion for
summary judgment with respect to each case on August 23, 1990. The Division filed
responses to those motions on September 20, 1990 and Respondent filed a final reply as to
each motion on October 11, 1990.

On March 6, 1991, the Court entered a recommended order as to each motion. On
March 13, 1991, the Utah Real Estate Commission and David L. Buhler, Executive Director
of the Department of Commerce, adopted the recommended orders which had been submitted.
By notice, dated April 2, 1991, both cases were rescheduled to be heard on May 29-30, 1991.
The hearing for the consolidated cases was so conducted and evidence was offered and
received.
The Administrative Law Judge, being fully advised in the premises, now submits the
following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order with respect to
both cases for review by the Utah Real Estate Commission and the Director of the Division
of Real Estate:
Case No. RE87-11-19 (Fact Situation I)
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Respondent is, and at all time relevant to this proceeding has been, the principal

broker for Copper State Realty. Respondent was initially licensed as a sales agent in either
1975 or 1976 and he received his broker's license in 1985.
2.

In March 1987, Celso Velez contacted Max Lloyd, a sales agent affiliated with

Copper State Realty, regarding one of the brokerage's listings. Mr. Velez and Mr. Lloyd
discussed a possible trade of the Velez home. No such trade occurred, but Respondent
subsequently contacted Mr. Velez and indicated he had potential buyers for the Velez home.
Mr. Velez agreed to pay a commission when Respondent inquired if he would do so. should
Respondent sell the home to the potential buyers. Respondent informed Mr. Velez the
potential buyers, Phil and Jan Wilson, were his in-laws.
3.

On April 5, 1987, Respondent prepared an earnest money sales agreement whereby

the Wilsons offered to purchase the Velez home for $75,000. The offer provided for a $3,150
cash down payment and a $71,750 FHA loan to be obtained by the Wilsons. The Velez's
agreed to pay $1,000 toward the Wilson's total financing and loan costs. Mr. Velez and
Respondent agreed the latter would receive a 6% commission, totalling $4,500. The Wilsons
had provided Respondent with a $100 personal check as earnest money to be deposited on
acceptance of the offer and the transaction was to close on or before May 15, 1987. Sparing
detail, the Velez's accepted the offer on April 12, 1987 and Respondent deposited the earnest
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money into the Copper State Realty trust account on April 13, 1987.
4.

When the Wilsons had not obtained necessary financing by May 15, 1987, the

lender notified Respondent an addendum or another earnest money sales agreement had to be
executed since the closing date had passed. The lender also informed Respondent the amount
of closing costs the Velez's had agreed to pay would reduce the maximum amount the
Wilsons could borrow.
5.

On May 20, 1987, Respondent prepared a second earnest money sales agreement,

which also reflected a $75,000 purchase price. The Wilson's offer provided for an $800
earnest money deposit in the form of "check and cash" (presumably $700 cash in addition to
the previous $100 check already deposited in Respondent's trust account), a $2,450 cash
down payment and the same amount to be financed as in the April 5, 1987 offer. Since that
offer had been made, loan discount points had decreased. Respondent so informed the
Velez's, who agreed to pay $400 toward the Wilson's total financing and loan costs with the
understanding Respondent's commission would thus increase to $5,100.
6.

Based on the credible evidence presented, Respondent told Mr. Velez that he

(Respondent) might have to lend monies to the Wilsons to help with their down payment and
Respondent may have also told Mr. Velez those monies would come from his commission.
However, Mr. Velez does not know whether any such payment was made and there is no
other direct or circumstantial evidence Respondent provided any such funds to the Wilsons.
7.

On May 20, 1987, the Velez's accepted the offer and the Wilsons provided a $400

check to Respondent, payable to Copper State Realty, as some of the additional $700 in
earnest money to be paid. Based on the credible evidence presented, Respondent received the
remaining earnest money in cash from Wilsons. However. Respondent did not deposit the
additional $700 earnest money in his trust account because the transaction was scheduled to
close on May 22, 1987, less than 72 hours later.
8.

On May 20, 1987, a Mick Quigley (who is Ms. Wilson's father) executed a gift

letter whereby he certified he had or would provide $2,250 to Ms. Wilson prior to the closing
to be applied toward the Wilson's purchase of the Velez home. Mr. Quigley further certified
he expected no repayment from the Wilsons in that regard. Based on the credible evidence
presented, Mr. Quigley provided about $1,500 of those funds (for the benefit of the Wilsons)
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to Respondent's wife (who is also Mr. Quigley's daughter) approximately one (1) week prior
to the closing of the transaction. Those funds were either deposited in Respondent's wife's
personal account or their joint checking account. This record does not reflect when Mr.
Quigley provided the remaining funds to Respondent.
9.

On May 22, 1987, Respondent issued a $2,000 check to Brighton Bank, which was

then used to purchase a May 22, 1987 cashiers check totalling $1,450.38 payable to American
Equity (the Wilson's lender on their purchase of the Velez home). The transaction closed on
May 22, 1987 and the Wilsons obtained the funds necessary to close on that transaction from
proceeds derived from the sale of their prior home and the gift monies made available by Mr.
Quigley. On May 27, 1987, the Velez's issued a $600 check to Respondent, representing the
additional commission they had agreed to pay him with regard to the sale of their home.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Section 61-2-11, Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended, provides a real estate licensee
may be placed on probationary status, suspended or revoked if the licensee, whether acting as
an agent or on his own account, is found guilty of:
(1)

making any substantial misrepresentation;

(8)
being unworthy or incompetent to act as a principle broker . . . as to
safeguard the interests of the public . . .;
(15) violating or disregarding the rules adopted by the commission and the
division;
(16) breaching a fiduciary duty owed by a licensee to his principle in a real
estate transaction . . .
The Division initially asserts Respondent violated Section 61-2-11(1) in two respects.
Specifically, the Division contends Respondent represented to the Velez's and the lender he
had $800 in earnest money from the Wilsons when he allegedly only had $100 on deposit in
that regard. The Division also asserts Respondent represented to the lender the Wilsons
would receive a portion of their down payment as a gift from Mr. Quigley when those funds
were allegedly given to the Wilsons from Respondent.
During the instant hearing, the Division presented testimony from Mr. Velez, the
Wilsons and Respondent as to the Velez-Wilson transaction. The Court has considered that
testimony with due regard for the respective ability of each witness to recall the various
4

aspects of the transaction. The Court has also duly considered the manner in which testimony
may have been affected by the self interest of a given witness and/or the respective familial
relationships between some of those witnesses. In many instances, the testimony offered by a
given witness was vague. In certain respects, relatively credible testimony offered by one
witness was either irreconcilable with the equally credible testimony of another witness or
relevant factual issues were not adequately addressed. Given the lack of credible and
substantial evidence presented, the Court concludes the Division's just-described assertions
are without a sufficient factual basis. Thus, the Division has failed to satisfy its burden of
proof regarding Count I.
With respect to Section 61-2-11(15), the Division asserts Respondent violated R174-42. That rule provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

4.2

All monies received in a real estate transaction must be
deposited in a separate non-interest bearing "Real Estate Trust
Account" in a Utah bank, credit union, savings and loan, or other
approved escrow depository in this state . . . .
4.2.1
All monies received by a licensee in a real
estate transaction, whether it be cash or check must be
delivered to the principal broker and deposited within three
banking days after receipt of the funds by the licensee.
4.2.5
All consideration represented as received
by a licensee on an Earnest Money Sales Agreement or their
document must have, in fact, been received by the licensee . .

The Division alternatively asseits Respondent either did not receive $700 in additional earnest
money from the Wilsons or he did not deposit those funds in his trust account. Given the
credible and substantial evidence presented, the Court concludes the Division's initial
assertion that Respondent did not receive the funds in question lacks a sufficient factual basis.
Thus, the Division has not established that R174-4-2(4.2.5) has been violated.
It is evident Respondent did not deposit the additional earnest money in his trust
account. Further, none of the three exceptions to R174-4-2(4.2.1) apply in this case. The
just-stated rule expressly requires a licensee to deposit the funds within three banking days
after receipt of those funds. However, that rule is silent whether such a deposit is required if
5

the transaction will close and the funds will be disbursed within three banking days of their
receipt by the licensee.
R 174-4-2(4.2.1) should be applied with due regard for the facts and circumstances of
this case and in recognition of the purpose for that rule, which is to ensure that funds
received by a licensee are properly deposited in trust for the benefit of the party entitled to
those funds. The closing statement reflects Respondent retained the $800 earnest money he
had received and then offset the commission due to him from the Velez's by that amount.
The earnest money was thus effectively disbursed, consistent with the terms of the May 20,
1987 earnest money sales agreement, notwithstanding the fact that said funds were not
previously deposited in Respondent's trust account. Since the rule would allow Respondent
three banking days from his receipt of the funds to deposit those funds and the closing on this
transaction occurred prior to that time, compliance with R174-4-2(4.2.1) should not be
required under those circumstances and no basis exists to conclude Respondent violated that
rule in this case. Thus, Count II is without merit.
The Division contends Respondent is unworthy or incompetent to act as a principal
broker. Specifically, the Division asserts Respondent misrepresented the nature of the
transaction to the lender as the means to enable the Wilsons to obtain financing they would
not have otherwise obtained. The Division also argues Respondent manipulated the
transaction: (1) to obtain a larger commission than the Velez's had originally agreed to pay
or (2) to secure more commission funds to be given to the Wilsons to help them purchase the
Velez home.
Given the lack of credible and substantial evidence presented, the Court concludes the
Division's just-described assertions are without an adequate factual bdMS. Specifically, there
is no sufficient evidence Respondent misrepresented the nature of this transaction with respect
to either the amount of earnest monies paid by the Wilsons or the source of the gift monies.
The compelling and pivotal testimony on those factual matters should have been forthcoming
from the Wilsons. However, their testimony was either vague or evasive in numerous
respects. The Division has thus failed to satisfy its burden of proof with respect to Count HI.
Finally, the Division urges Respondent breached his fiduciary duty to the Velez's and
thus failed to act in their best interest when he prepared the second earnest money sales
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agreement to either obtain a larger commission or secure more commission funds to be given
to the Wilsons to help them purchase the home. Concededly, the operative effect of that
agreement enabled the Wilsons to borrow additional funds to purchase the Velez home. The
second earnest money sales agreement also shifted $600, which the Wilsons would have paid
in discount points for the benefit of the Wilsons, to Respondent in the form of an increased
commission.
Arguably, the Velez's could have negotiated to obtain the benefit of the decrease in
discount points which occurred in the interim with respect to the two offers made by the
Wilsons in this transaction. However, the Velez's understood the changes made by the
second earnest money sales agreement (particularly that Respondent would receive a higher
commission), they realized their net proceeds from the sale would remain the same and they
agreed to thus accept the May 20, 1987 offer and sell their home under those circumstances.
Based on the foregoing, no breach of fiduciary duty has been established and Count IV is
without merit.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Counts I-IV, as set forth in Case No. RE87-11-19,
be dismissed and no disciplinary action be entered in that regard.
Dated this

/ V - ^ " day of March, 1992.

J( Steven El/lund
Aaministrative Law Judse
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Case No. RE87-11-19 (Fact Situation II)
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Respondent is, and at all time relevant to this proceeding has been, the principal
broker for Copper State Realty. Respondent was initially licensed as a sales agent in either
1975 or 1976. From 1979 to 1984, Respondent was the vice president of Westside
Development, a construction company. During that time, Respondent was involved in the
construction of approximately 70 new homes in that capacity. Respondent received his
principal broker's license in 1985. Since late-1985, Respondent has been the president of
Copper State Construction. During that time, Respondent was involved in the construction of
over 100 new homes in that capacity.
2. In late 1987, Robert and Peggy Stone owned a condominium located in
Taylorsville, Utah. Based on a referral from a co-worker for whom Copper State
Construction had built a home, the Stones contacted Max Lloyd, a sales agent affiliated with
Copper State Realty. The Stones and Mr. Lloyd discussed the possible sale of the Stone's
condominium to Copper State Construction, coupled with the Stone's purchase of a home to
be constructed by Copper State Construction. Mr. Lloyd introduced the Stones to Respondent
at the Copper State Realty office.
3. Pursuant to a December 2, 1987 earnest money sales agreement, Copper State
Construction offered to purchase the Stone's condominium for $88,000. The offer provided
for a $100 earnest money deposit, which had been received by Mr. Lloyd, a $14,400 cash
down payment and the possible assumption by Copper State Construction of the Stone's
existing $73,500 mortgage. The offer was made subject to the following conditions:
Seller to have the right to market and sell this property any time prior to
completion of their new home located at (Murray, Utah. Lot #5 Ridge Creek.
This offer is null and void if property is sold to a third party prior to completion
of seller's new home
The offer further provided that if Copper State Construction was required to assume the
Stone's existing mortgage "and/or obtain outside financing", Copper State Construction agreed
to use best efforts to do so and the offer was made subject to Copper State Construction's
"qualifying for and lending institution granting said assumption and/or financing". The offer
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further recited that Copper State Construction agreed to apply to assume the underlying
obligation and/or obtain new financing within ten (10) days after the Stone's acceptance of
the offer. The offer also recites the transaction would close on or before May 15, 1987.
Given the date of the earnest money sales agreement, the just-stated date is obviously in error,
the parties intending the closing to occur on or before May 15, 1988.
4. On December 28, 1987, the Stones made a counter offer, which provided they
would not be liable for any real estate commissions. On the just-stated date, the Stones and
Respondent—as president of Copper State Construction-executed a December 10, 1987
contract, whereby the Stones agreed to purchase property located on Lot #5, Ridge Creek
Subdivision in Murray, Utah and further agreed to purchase a home to be constructed on that
property by Copper State Construction. The contract price was $170,000 and the Stones
made a $1,500 deposit toward payment on the contract. The just-stated contract was also
subject to the Stones qualifying for financing on the new home. Copper State Construction
agreed to start construction on or before December 30, 1987 and complete construction within
145 days from that date.
5. The document used by the Stones and Copper State Construction with regard to the
Stone's purchase of the new home was not the standard earnest money sales agreement form
for residential construction. Rather, Respondent had obtained the form contract which he
used from a friend who had-in turn—obtained it from an attorney.
6. On December 29, 1987, Respondent-on behalf of Copper State Constructionaccepted the Stone's counter offer. The $100 earnest money had been deposited to the
Copper State Realty trust account on December 21, 1987. The Stones relied on Copper State
Construction's agreement to purchase their condominium and assume the existing mortgage
when they agreed to purchase the new home. Based on the credible evidence presented, the
Stones believed if their condominium was not sold prior to completion of the construction on
the new home, Copper State Construction would either assume the existing mortgage on the
condominium or obtain other financing and-in either case-the Stones would no longer be
obligated on the existing mortgage. Based on the substantial and credible evidence presented,
Respondent only intended to purchase the home on a simple assumption of the existing loan,
which would have been consistent with Copper State Construction's common and preferred
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practice when it agreed to build a new home in trade for an existing residence.
7. As of December 29, 1987, the Stones did not know under what circumstances the
existing mortgage on the condominium could be assumed. There is no substantial evidence
either Mr. Lloyd or Respondent discussed that matter with the Stones at that time. There is
also no substantial evidence Mr. Lloyd or Respondent ever made any inquiry of the lender at
that time whether the loan could be assumed or that Mr. Lloyd and Respondent discussed any
possible assumption of the loan by Copper State Construction.
8. In mid-May 1988, the Stones contacted Respondent as their new home was nearing
completion. The Stone's condominium had not been sold by that time. The Stones thus
requested Respondent to undertake efforts to assume the existing loan on their condominium.
Based on the credible evidence presented, Respondent informed the Stones he had only
intended to market their condominium for resale, he had only promised to make payments on
the existing mortgage until the condominium was sold and he never intended to formally
assume the existing loan to thus relieve the Stones from future liability for any payments on
that loan. Based on the more credible and substantial evidence presented, Respondent-on
behalf of Copper State Construction-contacted the lender on the mortgage for the Stone's
condominium and was informed Copper State Construction could not purchase the
condominium on a simple assumption, due to an owner occupancy requirement. When
Respondent subsequently offered to purchase the Stone's condominium on contract, the
Stones declined that offer.
9. The Stones had sought financing from Crossland Mortgage Company to purchase
the new home. Approval of any such financing was contingent on the sale of the Stone's
condominium. On July 26. 1988, the Stones notified Copper State Construction they were
terminating the contract to purchase the new home due to their inability to obtain financing.
Copper State Construction could not formally assume the loan on the Stone's existing
condominium nor was it ever Respondent's intent that Copper Sate Construction would do so.
The Stones refused to sell their condominium to Copper State Construction on a simple
assumption because it was never their intent to do so and they had initially agreed to sell the
condominium with the understanding that only Copper State Construction would be thereafter
obligated to make payment in satisfaction of the outstanding indebtedness on the
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condominium.
10. On July 26, 1988, the Stones thus demanded return of both the $1,500 deposit
regarding the new home and the $100 earnest money deposit Copper State Construction had
made respecting its' offer to purchase their condominium. The Stones also filed a complaint
with the Salt Lake Board of Realtors. On August 1, 1988, Respondent received a notice from
the Salt Lake Board of Realtors concerning that complaint. In late August or early September
1988, proceedings were conducted before a Board arbitration committee. On October 10,
1988, the Stones and Copper State Construction reached an agreement, whereby the latter
would return the $1,500 deposit paid by the Stones and the Stones executed a release of the
$100 earnest money. On October 10, 1988, the Stones received a $1,500 check, signed by
Respondent on behalf of Copper State Construction. When that check did not clear the bank,
Respondent subsequently replaced it with a cashier's check.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Section 61-2-11 provides a real licensee may be placed on probationary status,
suspended or revoked if the licensee, whether acting as an agent or on his own account, is
found guilty of:
(1)
making any substantial misrepresentation;
(2)
making any false promises of a character likely to influence,
persuade, or induce;
(15) violating or disregarding . . . the rules adopted by the
commission and the division . . . .
The Division initially asserts Respondent violated Section 61-2-11(1) when he represented to
the Stones that Copper State Construction would assume the mortgage on their condominium.
the Stones relied on that representation in agreeing to purchase the new home from Copper
State Construction and the latter did not assume—or apply to assume—the existing mortgage
on the condominium. The Division further urges Respondent violated Section 61-2-11(2)
when he made a false promise to the Stones that Copper State Construction would assume
their mortgage and he did not intend to assume that mortgage, as allegedly evidenced by the
provision in the earnest money sales agreement allowing for sale of the condominium to a
third party before closing and Copper State Construction's alleged failure to ever apply to
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assume the mortgage or obtain other financing to do so.
Sections 61-2-11(1) and (2) provide that a substantial misrepresentation or false
promise by a licensee may prompt entry of a disciplinary sanction. Utah courts have
frequently set forth the elements of an intentional, or fraudulent, misrepresentation as follows:
(1) a misrepresentation; (2) concerning a presently existing material fact; (3)
which was false; (4) which the representor either (a) knew to be false, or (b)
made recklessly knowing that he had insufficient knowledge upon which to base
such representation; (5) for the purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it;
(6) that the other party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity; (7) did
in fact rely upon it; (8) and was thereby induced to act; (9) to his injury and
damage.
Dugan vs. Jones, Utah, 615 P.2d 1239, 1246 (1980); Nikkelson vs. Quail Valley Realty, Utah,
641 P.2d 124, 126 (1982); Secor vs. Knight, Utah, 716 P.2d 790, 794 (1986); Conder vs. A.
L. Williams & Associates, Inc., Utah App., 739 P.2d 634, 637 (1987). Generally, intentional
fraud requires proof of an intent to deceive. Significantly, it has been recognized such intent
may be inferred if a misrepresentation is "voluntarily communicated to the victim with
knowledge that it is false, or without knowing whether it is true or false, but knowing that the
victim is likely to rely on it". Galloway vs. AFCO Development Corp., Utah App., 777 P.2d
506, 509 (1989).
It is well settled that a "promise of future performance, when made with a present
intent not to perform and made to induce a party to act in reliance on that promise,
constitutes actionable deceit and fraud."

Von Hake vs. Thomas, Utah, 705 P.2d 766, 770

(1985). In essence, a fraudulent misrepresentation or a "false promise", as that language is
used in Section 61-2-11(2), exists if a promise is made without a present intent to perform as
promised. Galloway vs. AFCO Development Corp.. supra; Berkeley Bank for Cooperatives

vs. Meibos, Utah, 607 P.2d 798, 805 (1980). In other words, the promisor must have had a
"preconceived intention not to perform the promises made." Schow vs. Guardtone, Inc., 18
Utah2d 135, 138, 417 P.2d 643 (1966). The mere fact a "promisor failed to perform his
promise" is not sufficient to establish a fraudulent misrepresentation. Schow vs. Guardtone,
Inc., supra.
Since the falsity of a promise is reflected by the present intent of the promisor not to
perform as promised, such alleged conduct necessarily involves proof of such an intent to
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deceive. Given the foregoing, and with particular regard to the facts of this case, the initial
inquiry is whether Respondent-acting as either an agent or on his own account-made a false
promise to the Stones with regard to whether Copper State Construction would assume the
existing mortgage on their condominium. It is evident the Stones and Respondent shared no
common intent and had no joint understanding that Copper State Construction would formally
assume the existing mortgage in question. There is no substantial evidence Respondenteither directly or through Mr. Lloyd-made any representation or promise to the Stones
regarding the manner by which Copper State Construction could or would assume that loan.
Further, the earnest money sales agreement does not clearly reflect whether Copper State
Construction's possible assumption of the loan would occur through either a formal or simple
assumption.
Significantly, the earnest money sales agreement expressly allowed the Stones to
market and sell their condominium to a third party prior to the completion of a new home. It
is obvious both the Stones and Respondent anticipated that possibility for approximately five
months and Respondent likely hoped the condominium would be sold to a third party before
it became necessary for Copper State Construction to assume the lean. When it became clear
no sale to a third party would be realized, the Stones contacted Respondent and the latter then
inquired of the lender as to whether the loan was assumable.
Nevertheless, Respondent-on behalf of Copper State Construction-had promised to
assume the loan without knowledge at that time whether Copper State Construction could do
so on a simple assumption. When Copper State Construction offered to purchase the
condominium, Respondent did not know under what-if any—circumstances the loan could be
a>sumed. Since Respondent intended Copper State Construction would only assume the loan
by a simple assumption, it was incumbent on Respondent to only make such a promise if he
knew Copper State Construction could do so.
Under those circumstances, Respondent recklessly represented to the Stones that
Copper State Construction would purchase the condominium and possibly assume their loan
on a simple assumption without sufficient knowledge on which to base that representation.
Thus, Respondent made a false promise that Copper State Construction would assume the
loan on the condominium by a simple assumption, he had insufficient knowledge upon which
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to promise such action since he did not know whether Copper State Construction could so
assume that loan and the promise was made for the purpose of inducing the Stones to
purchase a new home to be built by Copper State Construction. Further, the Stones acted
reasonably and in ignorance of whether their loan on the condominium could be assumed by
Copper State Construction, the Stones relied on the false promise made by Respondent and
they were thereby induced to act to their injury and damage. Respondent thus violated
Section 61-2-11(2).
The Division next asserts Respondent violated or disregarded R174-4.2.7.4, which
provides:
In the event a dispute arises over the return or forfeiture of the earnest
money and/or other trust funds, and no party has filed a civil suit arising
out of the transaction, the principal broker must, within fifteen (15) days
of notice of the dispute, provide the parties written notice of the dispute
and request them to meet to arbitrate the matter. The principal broker
holding the earnest money and/or trust funds must act as arbitrator. In the
event the dispute is not resolved in the arbitration attempt, the principal
broker must, within forty-five (45) days of the date on which the principal
broker mailed or delivered to both parties notice of the dispute, interplead
the disputed funds into the court of appropriate jurisdiction. A copy of the
interpleader action must be retained in the principal broker's files until
final disbursement of funds.
The Stones notified Respondent on July 26, 1988 of the dispute regarding both the $1,500
deposit concerning the new home and the $100 earnest money deposit Copper State
Construction had made respecting its offer to purchase their condominium. Pursuant to the
just-quoted rule, Respondent would have had fifteen (15) days from that date to provide the
Stones and Copper State Construction with written notice of the dispute and request them to
meet to arbitrate the matter. The rule, if strictly applied according to its terms, would have
also required Respondent to arbitrate the dispute.
Concededly, Respondent provided no written notice to the Stones and Copper State
Construction of the dispute and he did not request them to meet to arbitrate that matter.
Nevertheless, the Court duly notes Respondent's status as the president of Copper State
Construction. Under those circumstances, it would have been a clear conflict of interest for
Respondent to have arbitrated any dispute between the Stones and Copper State Construction.
Significantly, an arbitration proceeding was conducted before the Salt Lake Board of Realtors
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within approximately five (5) weeks after the Stones notified Respondent of the dispute.
Although there is no evidence Respondent took any action to initiate that proceeding and he
did not arbitrate the dispute, he should be excused from strict compliance with that
requirement of the rule.
R174-4.2.7.4 also requires that if the dispute is not resolved in an arbitration attempt
conducted within forty-five (45) days from the date the principal broker mailed or delivered
to both parties notice of the dispute, the principal broker shall interplead the disputed funds
into a court of appropriate jurisdiction. Over forty-five (45) days lapsed from the time the
Stones notified Respondent of the dispute until the Stones and Copper State Construction had
resolved the matter by agreement. While it is not clear from this record whether the
resolution of their dispute was a product of that arbitration proceeding or a separate
agreement between the Stones and Copper State Construction, the Court duly notes the unique
circumstances of this case. Based thereon, the Court is not persuaded R 174-4.2.7.4 should be
rigidly applied as to conclude Respondent has violated that rule. Thus, the Division's
assertion in that regard is without merit.
Finally, the Division asserts the contract which Respondent used to effect both the sale
of real property to the Stones and their purchase of a new residence was not the standard
earnest money sales agreement for residential construction approved for use by licensees.
The Division thus urges Respondent violated Section 61-2-20 and, as a consequence thereof,
Section 61-2-12(15).
Section 61-2-20 provides:
Real estate licensees may fill out those forms approved by the Utah
Real Estate Commission and the attorney general and those forms provided
by statute, with the following exceptions:
(1) Principal brokers and associate brokers may fill out any
documents associated with the closing of a
real estate transaction;
(2) Real estate licensees may fill out real estate forms prepared
by legal counsel of the buyer, seller, lessor, or lessee, or any
legal counsel, provided that the Real Estate Commission and
attorney general have not approved a specific form necessary
to that transaction.
Respondent admits he did not use the specific real estate form, approved by the Commission

15

and attorney general, to effect the Stone's purchase of the new home. However, Respondent
urges Section 61-2-10 does not apply because he did not prepare the contract as a licensee or
on behalf of Copper State Realty, but solely on behalf of Copper State Construction and that
Copper State Realty was not involved in that transaction.
No proper basis exists to view the two transactions between the Stones and Copper
State Construction as distinct and unrelated. Moreover, Section 61-2-11 can apply whether
Respondent acted in either his capacity as a licensee or on his own account. By analogy,
Section 61-2-20 should also apply under either circumstance in this case, even though
Respondent was acting as the president of Copper State Construction when he prepared and
used the contract in question. Consequently, Respondent violated Section 61-2-2(20) and a
further basis exists to enter a disciplinary sanction with respect to Respondent's license to
practice as a real estate principal broker.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
The recommended disciplinary action with respect to Counts VI-VIE in this case is
addressed below, in conjunction with the findings of fact and conclusions of law pertinent to
Case No. RE89-03-12, which was heard on a consolidated be ^ in this proceeding.
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Case No. RE89-03-12
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The findings of fact previously set forth in Paragraph 1 of Case No. RE87-11-19
(Factual Statement II) are incorporated herein by reference.
2. As of January 1988, James and Valerie Gaster owned a house located at 7588
Dover Hill Drive in Salt Lake City, Utah. Approximately two (2) years earlier, the Gasters
had listed that property for sale through Terry Hill-Black, a real estate sales agent. Based on
the credible evidence presented, Mrs. Gaster initially contacted Respondent in late 1987 and
she generally inquired about a possible trade of the Gaster home for another residence. Mrs.
Gaster also contacted Ms. Hill-Black about a possible trade of properties in that regard.
3. Based on the more credible evidence presented, Mr. Gaster saw an advertisement by
Copper State Realty and he specifically contacted Respondent to inquire about a trade of the
Gaster residence for a new home. Mr. Gaster met with Respondent in late January or early
February 1988 and Respondent saw the Gaster home, which was available for sale by owner
at that time. Ms. Hill-Black accompanied the Gasters when they saw a new home, located at
358 E. Bridlewalk Lane in Murray, Utah, built by Copper State Construction.
4. On February 9, 1988, the Gasters offered to purchase the Bridlewalk Lane property
from Copper State Construction for $189,000. Ms. Hill-Black, who was affiliated with Gump
& Ayers Real Estate Inc., represented the Gasters and she prepared that earnest money sales
agreement which provided the Gasters would apply for financing through Crossland
Mortgage Corporation.
5. On February 9, 1988, Copper State Construction offered to purchase the Gaster's
home for $102,000. Based on the credible and substantial evidence presented. Ms. Hill-Black
prepared that earnest money sales agreement at Respondent's direction, but it was Respondent
who represented the Gasters as their agent in that transaction. Respondent, acting as principal
broker for Copper State Realty, receipted the earnest money deposit on that offer and he
signed the offer in his capacity as president of Copper State Construction.
6. The just-described offer, which provided Copper State Construction would assume
the $83,000 existing mortgage on the Gaster's home, was also made subject to the following
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conditions:
Seller to have the right to market or sell property any time prior to
completion of home located at 358 E. Bridlewalk Lane, if home is sold
prior to completion of buyer's new home, this offer is null & void.
On February 10, 1988, the Gasters accepted the offer. Five days later, the Gasters entered
into a listing agreement with Copper State Realty, whereby the Dover Hill Drive property was
listed for sale at $94,000.
7. Sparing detail, addendums to both offers were executed on March 15, 1988,
whereby the sale price on the Dover Hill Drive and Bridlewalk Lane properties were reduced
to $94,000 and $181,000, respectively. The sale of each property was scheduled to close on
April 1, 1988. The Gasters applied for a conventional mortgage through Crossland Mortgage
Corporation to purchase the Bridlewalk Lane property. Proof of the Gaster's sale of their
home was a necessary condition to the financing on their purchase of the Bridlewalk Lane
property.
8. The closing on each transaction was conducted on April 21, 1988. Respondent, Ms.
Hill-Black and the Gasters were among those present at that time. Respondent signed the
closing statements as president of Copper State Construction. Both Gump & Ayers Real
Estate Inc. and Copper State Realty shared the commission on the sale of the Bridlewalk Lane
property. Mr. Gaster executed a warranty deed to Copper State Construction, whereby the
latter assumed and agreed to pay an all-inclusive trust deed with a current principle balance of
$82,988.24 in favor of a Dean C Burnham and Charlotte L. Beeson. Copies of the settlement
statement and the warranty deed on the sale of the Dover Hill Drive property were submitted
to Ciossland Moitgage Coipoiation as pi oof of the sale of that property Ciossland Mortgage
Corporation closed the loan on the Gaster's purchase of the Bridlewalk Lane propeity in
reliance on those documents
9. Based on the credible and substantial evidence presented, Respondent reasonably
believed Copper State Construction would be able to make the necessary payments when
Copper State Construction purchased the Dover Hill Drive property. However, several homes
which Copper State Construction had contracted to build were not timely completed between
sometime in April 1988 through June 1988 and various closings on newly constructed homes
were delayed or did not occur during that time. Consequently, Copper State Construction
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lacked the funds necessary to satisfy payments due on the Dover Hill Drive property.
10. Sometime between April 1988 and June 14, 1988, three liens were filed on the
Bridlewalk Lane property by subcontractors and suppliers for non-payment of services and
materials provided during the construction of that house. Specifically, a $244 lien was filed
sometime in April 1988 for garage doors which had been installed. This record does not
reflect exactly when that lien was filed. A $4,133 lien was filed on April 22, 1988 for
materials provided by Jordan Home Builders and a $2,980 lien was filed on June 14, 1988 for
labor and materials provided by Prows Plastering. Respondent did not inform the Gasters at
closing that any subcontractors or materialmen had not been paid. Copper State Construction
subsequently made payments to satisfy the just-described liens, although this record does not
reflect when those payments were made.
11. Copper State Construction's first payment on the trust deed note was due June 1,
1988. Ms. Beeson contacted Mr. Gaster and informed him no payment had been made. The
latter then inquired of Respondent, who indicated the payment had been made, but not
properly credited. Beyond Respondent's self-serving testimony, there is no substantial
evidence any such payment was made. Approximately one month later, Mr. Gaster became
aware still no payments had been made. Mr. Gaster then contacted Respondent, who
indicated he would attempt to make the necessary payments.
12. On September 4, 1988, a notice of default was recorded which reflected a $4,705
delinquency for non-payment from June through September 1988. On February 7, 1989,
notice was issued of a trustee sale to be conducted with respect to the Dover Hill Drive
property. The Gasters subsequently paid $8,750 to relinquish all claims and avoid foreclosure
on that property.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Section 61-2-11 provides a real estate licensee may be placed on probationary status,
suspended or revoked if the licensee, whether acting as an agent or on his own account, is
found guilty of:
(1) making any substantial misrepresentation;
(2) making any false promises of a character likely to influence,
persuade, or induce;
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(8) being unworthy or incompetent to act as a principal broker . . .
in such manner as to safeguard the interests of the public;
(16) breaching a fiduciary duty owed by a licensee to his principal
in a real estate transaction.
The Division initially asserts Respondent violated Section 61-2-11(1) when: (1) he
represented to the Gasters that Copper State Construction would purchase the Dover Hill
Drive property and assume the obligation on that property; (2) the Gasters relied on those
representations when they agreed to purchase the Bridlewalk property from Copper State
Construction; (3) Crossland Mortgage Corporation also relied on those representations when it
granted a loan to the Gasters for the just-referenced purchase; (4) Respondent knew or should
have known Copper State Construction would not be able to make the necessary payments on
the Dover Hill Drive property; and (5) Copper State Construction failed to make any
payments on the trust deed with respect to that property.
Concededly, Respondent became aware of Copper State Construction's perilous
financial condition shortly after the April 21, 1988 closing on its purchase of the Gaster's
home. Further, Copper State Construction made no payments with respect to the existing
trust deed on that property. However, there is a lack of sufficient evidence to conclude
Respondent—acting on behalf of Copper State Construction-promised to make the necessary
payments on the Gater's home with an existing intent not to so perform. As previously
noted, the mere fact that "a promisor failed to perform his promise" is not sufficient to
establish a fraudulent misrepresentation. Schow v. Guardtone, Inc., supra. Importantly, there
is a lack of sufficient evidence Respondent knew or should have known Copper State
Construction would be unable to make those payments when Copper State Construction
agreed to do so. Given the foregoing, the Division's assertions that Respondent violated
Sections 61-2-11(1) or (2) in those respects is without merit.
However, Respondent's failure to disclose to the Gasters that subcontractors and
materialmen had not been paid constitutes a misrepresentation by omission. Based on the
evidence presented, that misrepresentation was intentionally made and was also substantial,
within the meaning of Section 61-2-11(1). Whether it is a common occurrence for
outstanding amounts to be owed for materials and labor provided as to the construction of a
new home at the time the sale of that home is closed, Respondent should have advised the
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Gasters if any such indebtedness existed at the time of closing. His failure to do so
constitutes a violation of Section 61-2-11(1). Fortunately, Copper State Construction
subsequently made payment to satisfy the liens which had been filed on the Gaster's home.
The Division next asserts Respondent is either unworthy or incompetent to act as a
principal broker in such manner as to safeguard the interests of the public. The Court
initially notes Mr. Gaster contacted Respondent sometime in June 1988 and inquired why
Copper State Construction had made no payment with respect to the trust deed. Respondent's
subsequent conduct is seriously disturbing in certain respects. Other than his mere assurance
to Mr. Gaster that the June 1988 payment had been made, there is no evidence Respondent
then exercised any reasonable diligence to insure the payment was made and properly credited
as to protect the Gasters' interests. Respondent was also aware of Copper State
Construction's mounting cash flow problems at that time, yet he neglected to disclose that
fact to Mr. Gaster.
Although Respondent later told Mr. Gaster he would try to make the necessary
payments as to the trust deed, Respondent had no reasonable basis to believe he could do so.
Further, Respondent still failed to inform the Gasters of Copper State Construction's
deteriorating financial condition. Since Copper State Construction did not formally assume
the existing indebtedness on the Dover Hill Drive property and the Gasters would thus be
obligated to make timely payment in satisfaction of the trust deed if Copper State
Construction failed to do so, Respondent should have kept the Gasters fully informed as to
any difficulties which Copper State Construction encountered in making timely payment of
that monthly obligation. Respondent's failure to do so required the Gasters to subsequently
expend a significant lump sum amount to avoid foreclosure on the Dover Hill Drive property.
Respondent's misconduct reflects an inexcusable failure to protect the Gasters' interests. He
has thus violated Section 61-2-11(8) and a proper basis exists to enter a disciplinary sanction
in that regard.
Finally, the Division asserts Respondent violated Section 61-2-12(16) when he
allegedly breached a fiduciary duty owed to the Gasters in the transaction under review.
Based on the more credible and substantial evidence presented, Respondent was the agent for
the Gasters with regard to Copper State Construction's purchase of the Gaster's home.
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Respondent thus owed the Gasters a fiduciary duty to act in their best interest. Respondent
breached that duty when he represented to the Gasters that Copper State Construction would
make the necessary payments on the trust deed, but no such payments were subsequently
made.
A considered review of Respondent's conduct with regard to the transactions involving
the Stones and the Gasters reveals numerous instances when he violated those statutes and/or
rules which govern the conduct of principal brokers and sales agents in this state.
Respondent's repeated failure to adequately protect the interests of the Stones and the Gasters
was often coupled with his consistent efforts to further either his own interests or those of
Copper State Construction. Simply put, Respondent did not act in an honest and ethical
manner and he failed to properly discharge his duties as a licensee. Respondent's multiple
instances of unprofessional conduct warrant entry of an appropriate disciplinary sanction to
thus adequately protect the public health, safety and welfare.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Respondent's license to practice as a real estate
principal broker be revoked, said revocation to become effective as provided by Section 61-212(2)(c)(i).
Dated this

.

^

/6**dav of March, 1992.

Administrative Law Judge
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BEFORE THE
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ORDER ON REVIEW
CASE NO. RE87-11-19
CASE NO. RE89-03-12

IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSE
OF RANDY KRANTZ TO ACT AS A
REAL ESTATE PRINCIPAL BROKER

INTRODUCTION
This

is

a

review,

upon

the

request

of

Randy

Krantz

("Respondent") of a decision of the Real Estate Commission (the
"Commission") and the Division of Real Estate of the Department of
Coiomerce

(the ^Division"), dated April 8, 1992, which revoked

Respondent's license to act as a Real Estate Broker. The Order was
the result of consolidation of the two above-referenced cases.
Therev was no oral argument in connection with this review, and
Respondent represented himself during the review process.

STATUTES OR RULES PERMITTING OR REQUIRING REVIEW
Review is conducted pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section
63-46b-12, and Rule 151-46b-12 of the Rules of Procedure for
Adjudicative Proceedings before the Department of Commerce.

THE ISSUES REVIEWED
Respondent did not clearly identify those facts from the
Order's Findings of Facts which he disputes on appeal.

From

Respondent's lengthy narrative supporting his request for review,
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the issues can be summarized as follows:
1.

Whether the Board's and Division's Orders are supported

by the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law; and
2.

Whether the length of time which passed between filing

the petitions, and issuing the Order, prejudices Respondent.

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Findings of Fact adopted by the Commission and the

Division are adopted for purposes of this Review.

They are

lengthy, and will not be repeated herein. With respect to Case No.
RE 87-11-19, a portion of the Complaint was dismissed, as the Order
concluded that the Division had not met its burden of proof with
respect to the complaint involving the Velez's.

Respondent does

not appeal that portion of the Order, and, consequently, it is not
reviewed herein.
2.

Respondent offered his version of events in his request

for review. However, he did not clearly indicate which Findings of
Fact he believed to be incorrect or unsupported by the evidence.
It appears

that Respondent was, in the request

for review,

repeating the evidence he presented at the hearing. The Board and
the Administrative Law Judge were present, heard the testimony of
both sides, and weighed the evidence.

Respondents' repeating his

evidence in the request for review does not constitute sufficient
grounds to overturn the Findings of Fact. For any findings to be
overturned on review, Respondent would need to show how a finding
of fact was made erroneously, or was not based on the evidence
-2-
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presented, and show how his version of the facts was supported by
the evidence,
3.

Finally, much of Respondent's assertions in the request

for review, even if true, would not materially change the outcome.
In Case No. RE87-11-19, the Order was based on a finding that
Respondent

made

a

substantial

misrepresentation.

The

fact

supporting this finding was primarily that Respondent had offered
to assume the Stones' loan, and that such promise was made
recklessly because Respondent did not know whether or not he would
be able to assume the loan, or disregarded evidence that he would
not be able to do so. Respondent, in his request for review, does
not dispute that he offered to assume the loan.

Nor does he

dispute that his company was in serious financia] difficulty at the
time.
4.

The Order also was based on the fact that Respondent used

a form not approved by the Division, in connection with the
contract which Respondent used to effect the sale of property to
the Stones and the Stones' purchase of a new home. Respondent does
not dispute that the form was unauthorized, but asserts that
authorization was not required because the transaction was on
behalf of Copper State Construction, rather than Copper State
Realty, and the two entities were not related.
of Facts on this point —

Thus, the Finding

that Copper State Construction entered

into an agreement to purchase the Stone's existing home, as well as
a second agreement to sell another home to the Stones, and neither
form was

approved

by

the Division

—

is upheld;

the legal
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consequence of this Finding (whether Copper State Construction is
"related" to Copper State Realty and, thus, approval was required
—

is discussed below, in the Conclusions of Law.
5.

In Case No. RE 89-03-12, the Order was based on a finding

that Respondent had failed to disclose existing liens and potential
liens against the home sold to the Gasters, and had failed to
disclose Copper State Construction's financial problems to the
Gasters, at a time when it had undertaken certain

financial

obligations and was unlikely to be able to meet them.

Again, as

before,

Respondent

reasserts

his

version

of

events

without

specifically showing how the Findings of Fact were incorrect.
Indeed, Respondent acknowledges the existing liens on the Gaster's
home, and that suppliers had not been paid at the time of closing.
6.

The other key finding of fact in that Order was that

Respondent had been acting in the capacity of an "agent" for the
Gasters, thereby owing them a fiduciary duty.

Respondent appears

to assert that he was not in fact the Gasters' agent, because
Copper State Realty had no listing agreement with the Gasters to
sell their old home, and a commission was not charged. The request
for review acknowledges that Respondent inspected the Gaster's old
home; discussed with the Gasters the possible purchase of the home
by Copper State Construction; allowed an earnest money agreement to
be prepared which showed that Copper State Realty would deposit
money into its trust account; that Copper State Construction was to
make payments on its purchase of the Gaster's old home; that
Respondent was making decisions as to whether or not to rent the
-4-
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old home

(Mwe believed the home to be more marketable if it was

vacantM) ; and that Copper State Construction "intended to sell this
home".

It

is

impossible

to

find,

given

these

facts

and

circumstances, that Respondent did not act as an agent for the
Gasters. Whether or not he believed he was an agent, certainly the
Gasters were entitled to believe that he was their agent, acting on
their behalf.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

In Case No. 87-11-19, the finding that Respondent made a

substantial misrepresentation in his promise to assume the Stones'
loan

constitute

sufficient

evidence

to

find

that

Respondent

violated §61-2-11(1).
2.

In Case No. 87-11-19, the Conclusions of Law also found

that Respondent used a form not approved by the Division, in
violation of 61-2-20, and that this constituted grounds for action
against

Respondent's

license

under

§61-2-12(15)

apparently a misprint, and should be §61-2-11(15)).

(which

is

That portion

of the Order also references §61-2-10, making it unlawful for an
agent to accept consideration from anyone other than his principal
broker.

Respondent asserts that Copper State Realty and Copper

State Construction were not related, and that one could not
possibly

know

about

the

financial

condition

of

the

other.

Respondent was President and director of Copper State Construction.
His wife was owner of 50% of the shares.
statement

In light of this, his

that, since he was not an owner

of Copper

State

-5-
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Construction he did not know of its financial problems is plainly
without merit.

And, in light of the fact that Respondent was

principal broker for Copper State Realty, the conclusions that the
transactions were related and should have been evidenced by use of
a form approved by the division are upheld.
3.

In Case No. RE 89-03-12, the failure to disclose existing

liens and unpaid debts constituted substantial misrepresentations
under the circumstances, and the Conclusions of Law that Respondent
violated. §61-2-11(1) are upheld.

Similarly, Respondent violated

the fiduciary duty he had to the Gasters to disclose the financial
problems of Copper State Construction.

The original conclusion

that his failure to do so constitutes a violation of §61-2-11(8)
and §61-2-11(16) is upheld.
4.

With

respect

to

whether

delay

between

filing

the

Petitions and issuing the Order should constitute grounds for
overturning the Order, the key length of time is the approximately
nine months which elapsed between the date of the hearing (May 29
and 30, 1991) and the date of the order (April 8, 1992).

The

original

and

petitions

were

filed

during

August

of

1989

consolidated shortly thereafter so as to be heard in one hearing.
Respondent originally defaulted, having failed to answer, and was
granted an extension of time by the Administrative Law Judge to
answer the Petition.

Respondent also moved for summary judgement

during the interim before the hearing, and certain settlement
negotiations occurred, which also cause delay in the petitions'
being heard. The Recommended Order was prepared on March 18, 1992,
-6-
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and adopted by the Commission — which typically meets only once a
month — on April 8. Respondent is understandably unsatisfied with
the delays in this case. Some of them were at his behest. There
cannot be an absolute time of delay between a hearing and issuance
of an order which can be held to be both unreasonable and injurious
to Respondent.

Although it is unfortunate, it is not clearly

unreasonable, given that the case involved two separate petitions,
which between them set out three different factual situations. The
hearing consumed two days and there evidently were a large number
of witnesses and abundant documentary evidence to consider. There
was no formal restriction on Respondent's practice during the
pendency of these matters.
unreasonable

or

so

Therefore, the delay was not so

injurious

to

Respondent

as

to

require

overturning the Order.

ORDER
IT IS ORDERED THAT:
The Order in this case is upheld. Pursuant to Department Rule
151-46b-12 (B) , the effective date of that order is now ten (10)
days after the date this Order on Review has been mailed to all
parties, or June^2 , 1992.

Dated this

_ day of June, 1992.

David L. Buhler, Executive Director
Department of Commerce
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NOTICE OF RIGHT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
Judicial review of this Order may be sought by filing a
Petition for Review within thirty (30) days after the issuance of
this Order. Any Petition for such Review shall comply with the
requirements set forth in Section 63-46b-14 and Section 63-46b-16.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify^that on the
day of June 1992 I caused to
be mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order on Review,
properly addressed, postage prepaid, (unless otherwise indicated)
to;
Respondent:
Randy Krantz
2216 East Lauri Kay Drive
Salt Lake City, UT 84124
Attorney for Respondent:
Nicholas E. Hales
Woodbury/ Jensen, Kesler & Swinton
265 East 100 South, Suite 300
P.O. Box 3358
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-3358
and caused a copy to be hand-delivered to:
^'Blaine E. Twitchell, Director
Division of Real Estate
P.O Box 45806
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0806
Robert Steed, Assistant A,G.
Beneficial Life Tower
11th Floor
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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